



The Crowdfund Act’s Strange Bedfellows: 






Empowering the masses has a history of launching revolutions.  In the 
1700s, who would have thought the upstart and inauspicious American 
democracy would revolutionize politics for centuries?
1
  Yet history has 
demonstrated that emphasizing equal opportunity for all and relying on the 
general public’s voting decisions proved preferable to aristocratic privilege. 
A similar theme of democracy challenging privilege is embodied in the 
Crowdfund Act.
2
  Before the Crowdfund Act, securities laws gave wealthy, 
accredited
3
 investors nearly exclusive access to investments in start-up 
companies.
4
  The Crowdfund Act introduces a democratic paradigm shift by 
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 1.  E.g., PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 139 (Harper Perennial ed. 
1997) (quoting a British “minister in charge of colonial matters” whose “contemptuous view” of 
democracy characterized the monarchical perspective of the era: “I would not have men in 
mercantile cast every day collecting themselves together and debating on political matters”).  
 2.  See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) 
[hereinafter JOBS Act].  This article uses the term “Crowdfund Act” because it is the name Congress 
gave to the crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act, though the Crowdfund Act is technically Title 
III of the larger JOBS Act.  See generally C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding 
Exemption: Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (2012) [hereinafter Bradford, The New 
Federal Crowdfunding Exemption] (providing detailed discussion and analysis of the Crowdfund 
Act’s provisions). 
 3.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2013). A natural person qualifies as an accredited investor 
with (1) an “individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, exceed[ing] 
$1,000,000” excluding that person’s primary residence or (2) “an individual income in excess of 
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person’s spouse in excess of 
$300,000 in each of those years and . . . a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level 
in the current year.”  Id.   
 4.  See Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 
3394, 3396 (2013) (“U.S. securities law has always allowed wealthy investors to enter certain 
markets (including not only the market for private company investments but also private equity 
funds and hedge funds), while cordoning off average (retail) investors from the same 
opportunities. . . .  The logical question . . . is why a democratic political system has allowed such 
unequal treatment to continue.”); Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private 
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inviting all investors to invest in start-up companies that seek funds through 
Internet crowdfunding.
5
  But democratic revolutions are messy, and it can be 
tempting to retreat to yesterday’s refuge where experts, or in crowdfunding’s 
case, wealthy investors, were almost exclusively in charge.  Failing to 
embrace crowdfunding’s democratic promise, though, would be a mistake.  
This article argues that the Crowdfund Act’s democratic intent should be 
protected and nurtured so that crowdfunding’s democratic characteristics 
have the opportunity to develop and evolve. 
Fusing democratic participation and start-up company investing is an 
uneasy union, as Part II briefly explains.  The Crowdfund Act reflects the 
strain of uniting the competing value systems of democracy, where each 
citizen has one equal vote, and capitalism (i.e., start-up company investing), 
where wealthier investors wield greater market power.  Part III briefly 
summarizes the main provisions of the Crowdfund Act.  Then, to examine 
the Crowdfund Act’s juxtaposition of democratic values against economic 
clout proportionate to investors’ wealth, Parts IV through VI analyze three 
areas where the Crowdfund Act alternately incorporates, rejects, and 
potentially undermines democratic participation. 
Part IV compares start-up companies’ typical preference for few 
investors, each of whom invests a lot, with crowdfunding’s embrace of many 
investors, each of whom invests a little.  It then considers whether 
crowdfunded companies, which are by definition small, private enterprises, 
but which are likely to have hundreds, or even thousands, of investors, 
should have quasi-public reporting obligations.  Such reporting obligations 
reinforce the democratic spirit of crowdfunding by giving investors in small 
companies unprecedented statutory information rights.  But the obligations 
must be implemented carefully to avoid over-burdening start-up enterprises. 
Part V contrasts venture capitalists’ experienced, personal attention to 
their portfolio investments with the crowd’s inexperienced, dispersed 
monitoring of its investments.  It also highlights the differences between 
investing in a relatively efficient stock market, such as the market for public 
company stocks with active day trading and extensive analyst coverage, and 
investing in an inefficient market, such as the market for most start-up 
company stocks.  Part V then argues that the Crowdfund Act should promote 
                                                          
Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. REV. 745, 800 (2013) (observing that “the private securities market 
represents an entire class of investments that are out of reach for the retail investor”).  A small and 
limited exception is Rule 504 of Regulation D, which allows unaccredited investors with a 
preexisting relationship with the issuer (i.e., friends and family) to invest up to $1 million in a non-
public offering.  See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 5.  See JOBS Act sec. 302(a) (allowing investors of any income or net worth level to invest in 
crowdfunding offerings). 
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crowdfunding’s democratic characteristic of the wisdom of the crowd and 
require crowdfunded companies to communicate with potential investors 
over the Internet.  It also investigates whether, as an analog to citizens’ 
ability and responsibility to select and monitor political leaders,
6
 retail 
investors will be skilled at selecting and monitoring investments in start-up 
companies. 
Part VI examines the Crowdfund Act’s investment caps on the amount 
companies can raise and individuals can invest each year in crowdfunding 
securities offerings.  It then explains how these caps tip the delicate balance 
between democratic participation and capitalist tendencies too far in favor of 
capitalism because the caps create the potential for crowdfunded companies 
and wealthy investors to crowd out lower- to middle-income investors from 
promising crowdfunding offerings.  As a result, Part VI advocates 
regulations to help the Crowdfund Act deliver on its democratic promise of 
opening start-up company investing to all Internet investors, without 
sacrificing crowdfunding’s capitalist potential. 
II. CROWDFUNDING, DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION, AND CAPITALISM 
A. Democratic Origins of Crowdfunding 
Crowdfunding means using the Internet to pool financial contributions 
(usually in small individual amounts) from many people (i.e., the crowd) for 
a common purpose.
7
  The practice is popular in such diverse areas as raising 
money in politics,
8
 facilitating person-to-person lending,
9
 donating to non-
profit causes,
10
 and launching creative ventures.
11
  Crowdfunding grew out 
                                                          
 6.  See, e.g., JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER 
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND 
NATIONS 22, 224–58, 266–68 (2004) (applying the wisdom of crowds to financial markets and 
political elections in a representative democracy).  
 7.  See JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE 
FUTURE OF BUSINESS 247, 253 (hardcover ed. 2008). 
 8.  E.g., Daniel M. Satorius & Stu Pollard, Crowd Funding: What Independent Producers 
Should Know About the Legal Pitfalls, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 15, 16 (2010) (discussing the use of 
crowdfunding for President Obama’s 2012 campaign). 
 9.  E.g., Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online Peer-To-Peer Lending in the 
Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 501 (2012); Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-To-Person 
Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 447 (2011). 
 10.  E.g., About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Nov. 15, 2013); Sarah B. 
Lawsky, Money for Nothing: Charitable Deductions for Microfinance Lenders, 61 SMU L. REV. 
1525, 1530–33 (2008). 
 11.  E.g., Our Movement, ROCKETHUB, http://www.rockethub.com/about (last visited Nov. 15, 
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of “crowdsourcing,”
12
 which, instead of pooling money as in crowdfunding, 
concentrates collective knowledge on solving problems or accomplishing 
tasks, thereby celebrating the democratic “wisdom of the crowd”
13
 over the 
specialized knowledge of experts.
14
  The wisdom of the crowd does not 
imply “that a group will always give you the right answer” but instead 
means “that on average it will consistently come up with a better answer 
than any individual could provide.”
15
 
For example, the crowd has resolved scientific puzzles that stumped 
experts
16
 and has demonstrated its wisdom repeatedly in various computer 
programming challenges, such as the development of Netflix’s movie 
recommendation algorithm and Linux’s open-source software.
17
  The 
crowd’s wisdom is also the backbone of Google’s search engine, other 
Google products and applications, Wikipedia’s user-generated encyclopedia, 
and Amazon’s product rating system.
18
  Further, the most accurate 
prediction markets rely on the wisdom of the crowd, and one of the strongest 
testaments to the crowd’s acumen is the difficulty expert stock traders have 
in consistently beating the stock market’s performance.
19
 
                                                          
2013); Learn How to Raise Money for an Idea, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/learn-how-
to-raise-money-for-a-campaign (last visited Nov. 15, 2013); Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, 
KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited Nov. 15, 
2013).  
 12.  See Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 2006), 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html. Howe’s article is one of the first articles, if 
not the first, to define “crowdsourcing.” 
 13.  SUROWIECKI, supra note 6. 
 14.  See generally HOWE, supra note 7 (discussing crowdsourcing and providing numerous 
examples of the wisdom of the crowd); SUROWIECKI, supra note 6 (analyzing the wisdom of the 
crowd). 
 15.  SUROWIECKI, supra note 6, at 235.  But see Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in 
Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 7 (2009) (critiquing the wisdom of crowds principle and 
asserting that “the social psychology literature is on the whole pessimistic about the wisdom of 
crowds”). 
 16.  See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 7, at 146–54 (InnoCentive, a network of scientists who solve 
scientific problems); SUROWIECKI, supra note 6, at 158–61 (successful collaboration of labs 
worldwide in 2003 by the World Health Organization to find cause of  SARS and discovery of “top 
quark particle” in 1994 by 450 physicists).  See generally SUROWIECKI, supra note 6, at 161–72 
(explaining the benefits of scientific collaboration). 
 17. HOWE, supra note 7, at 53–54, 155–58.  See also, e.g., HOWE, supra note 7, at 122–27 
(software programming competitions by TopCoder), 135–38 (software programming competitions 
by Mathworks that allow users to tweak each other’s codes). 
 18.  See HOWE, supra note 7, at 57–61, 75, 234–37, 279 (providing “a one-word response: 
Google” to questions about “whether the failure of” some crowdsourcing projects “signifies the 
failure of crowdsourcing” generally).  
 19. See HOWE, supra note 7, at 160–63, 165–66, 169–73 (discussing accuracy of the Iowa 
Political Stock Market in predicting election outcomes, the Hewlett-Packard “market” made up of 
employees who were rewarded by predicting sales, and Marketocracy mock investments); 
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Crowdfunding aligns with the Internet phenomena of social networking 
and viral marketing in that it functions most effectively when many people 
are connected through a common interest.
20
  Like successful candidates in 
democratic elections, crowdfunding prowess derives from large numbers of 
equal followers, not from small groups of influential or wealthy contributors.  
It is democratic insofar as any idea that captures the attention of the crowd 
can attract substantial amounts of money, typically in low-dollar 
contributions from numerous people, similar to how politicians achieve 
electoral success in a democracy by winning the support of many voters who 
each casts a single vote. 
For example, countless crowdfunding projects have received widespread 
support from thousands of Internet users.
21
  The campaign to fund the 
creation of an elevated iPhone dock amassed nearly $1.5 million from over 
12,500 supporters.
22
  The Project Eternity video game campaign raised 
almost $4 million from nearly 74,000 fans.
23
  The OUYA video game 
console project collected over $8.5 million from more than 63,000 people.
24
  
Examples of other, more modest projects include the Reverence photography 
campaign, which raised $50,015 from 210 backers,
25
 and the “self-cleaning 
fish tank that grows food” project, which received almost $250,000 from 
4,097 supporters.
26
  One European study found that the median 
crowdfunding project targets €100,000 and raises €28,500.
27
 
                                                          
SUROWIECKI, supra note 6, at 235–36 (asserting that “the fact that only a tiny fraction of investors 
consistently do better than the market remains the most powerful piece of evidence that the market is 
efficient”); Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Prediction Markets and the First Amendment, 
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 837–40 (2008) (discussing and providing examples of prediction markets). 
 20. See Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS. 
VENTURING 1, 8 (forthcoming 2014) (correlating the success rate of crowdfunded projects on 
Kickstarter with the number of Facebook “friends” a project founder has). 
 21. E.g., Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/stats (last visited Nov. 15, 2013); 
Kickstarter Stats, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 
 22. Casey Hopkins et al., Elevation Dock: The Best Dock for iPhone, KICKSTARTER, 
http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/hop/elevation-dock-the-best-dock-for-iphone?ref=most-funded 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 
 23. Obsidian Entertainment, Project Eternity, KICKSTARTER, 
http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/obsidian/project-eternity?ref=most-funded (last visited Nov. 15, 
2013). 
 24. OUYA, OUYA: A New Kind of Video Game Console, KICKSTARTER, 
http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/ouya/ouya-a-new-kind-of-video-game-console?ref=most-
funded (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 
 25. Zana Briski, Reverence, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1072396487/ 
reverence-0?ref=most-funded (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 26. Nikhil & Alejandro, Home Aquaponics Kit: Self-Cleaning Fish Tank that Grows Food, 
KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/2142509221/home-aquaponics-kit-self-cleaning-
fish-tank-that-g?ref=most-funded (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 27. Armin Schwienbacher & Benjamin Larralde, Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial 
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Prior to the Crowdfund Act, however, securities laws made it difficult 
for start-up companies to offer their securities to the general public, which 
effectively prohibited crowdfunding for equity securities in start-up 
companies.
28
  Instead, start-up companies relied overwhelmingly on Rule 
506 of Regulation D
29
 and offered their securities to accredited investors 
while excluding the general public from the opportunity to invest in start-up 
companies, “creating a world divided into investing haves and have-nots” 
for investments in private companies.
30
  Against this regulatory backdrop, 
                                                          
Ventures, in HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 369, 371 (Douglas Cumming ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2012). 
 28.  E.g., C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 29–45 (2012) [hereinafter Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities 
Laws].  Bradford provides: “Section 5 of the Securities Act and the SEC rules associated with 
Section 5 are a morass of prohibitions, exceptions, conditions, and exceptions to exceptions . . . .  
Offerings of securities must be registered with the SEC unless an exemption is available.  
Unfortunately, registration is not a viable option for early-stage small businesses seeking relatively 
small amounts of capital.  It is too expensive and too time-consuming for crowdfunded offerings. . . .  
Companies selling securities on crowdfunding sites could avoid registration if an exemption were 
available.  Several exemptions might possibly apply. . . .  Unfortunately, none of those exemptions is 
conducive to crowdfunding.” Id. (footnotes omitted).  Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or 
Fraudfunding?  Social Networks and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption 
Must be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1744–50 (2012). Hazen 
provides: “. . . prior to the JOBS Act, there were no exemptions from registration that could be used 
for crowdfunding capital raising without requiring that an offering circular be sent to potential 
investors prior to their being asked to make an investment decision.  However, the SEC already had 
statutory authority to craft an exemption that could apply to crowdfunding. . . .  [T]here were a 
number of proposals to provide such an exemption, and these proposals led to the JOBS Act.” Id. 
(footnotes omitted).  Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sheldon Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: 
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 892–907 (2011) (assuming that 
“crowdfunding interests are securities within the meaning of Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities 
Act[,]  . . . crowdfunding websites and crowdfunded ventures [are exposed] to the prospect of 
regulation—including through the expensive and time-consuming process of registering offers and 
sales of securities—under the Securities Act” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Nikki D. Pope, 
Crowdfunding Microstartups: It’s Time for the Securities and Exchange Commission to Approve a 
Small Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973, 986–93 (2011) (“The present construction of 
securities regulations leaves very little room for microstartups to raise capital.  What room there is 
comes at a price that may be too high for entrepreneurs to bear, assuming the entrepreneur can even 
figure out what she has to do to be in regulatory compliance.”). 
 29. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2008).  Offerings under the Rule 506 safe harbor can be for an 
unlimited dollar amount, must include resale restrictions, and—prior to implementation of the JOBS 
Act’s amendments—must avoid a public solicitation—i.e., the offering must target accredited 
investors and the issuer must reasonably believe there are no more than thirty-five unaccredited 
investors.  The JOBS Act loosens Rule 506 requirements even further by allowing public 
solicitations so long as only accredited investors purchase securities in a Rule 506 offering.  JOBS 
Act sec. 201(a)(1). 
 30. Rodrigues, supra note 4, at 3422.  Securities law “discriminates on the basis of wealth, as a 
proxy for sophistication, or the ability to fend for oneself.  Securities law thus in theory, as in 
practice, marginalizes the average investor . . . .”  Id. at 3427.  Indeed, one study found that only 
approximately 15% of private securities offerings under Regulation D that sought $5 million or less 
included unaccredited investors.  Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The 
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Congress endorsed crowdfunding’s democratic character
31
 by granting all 




Though the Crowdfund Act permits wealthy investors to invest more 
money than average investors, the Act does not exclude any investors, as 
even low-income investors are allowed to invest up to $2,000 per year in 
crowdfunded securities offerings.
33
  Thus, like the achievement of universal 
suffrage in political elections, the Crowdfund Act represents a unique 
democratic milestone in securities regulation because it opens start-up 
company investing to the general public, at least in those start-up companies 
that seek to raise capital through crowdfunding.
34
  But therein lies the rub: 
whereas other forms of crowdfunding, such as non-profit donations, political 
fundraising, third-world lending, and artistic support, complement 
democratic values relatively seamlessly, crowdfunding investment abuts the 
democratic ethos of the crowd against the competitive forces of capitalist 
markets. 
Accordingly, Congress conditioned the democratic access to 
crowdfunding investments on numerous investor-protection measures.
35
  It 
                                                          
Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919, 930 
(2011).  
 31. E.g., 158 CONG. REC. S1830 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mary Landrieu) 
(“We want to make this process more democratic.  We want to get out of the secret boardrooms and 
the private conversations on Wall Street.  So many more people could take advantage, appropriately, 
of exciting investments in the entrepreneurial spirit of America.”).  For additional discussion of the 
democratic intent of the Crowdfund Act, see infra Part V.B. 
 32. JOBS Act sec. 302(a). 
 33. Id.  As discussed in more depth in Part V, the $2,000 investment cap applies to anyone with 
an annual income or net worth between $0 and $40,000. 
 34. As discussed in more depth in Part V, the democratic milestone is not absolute insofar as 
the total amount a company may raise each year through crowdfunding is capped at $1 million.  
JOBS Act sec. 302(a).  Therefore, crowdfunding investors will still be excluded from higher dollar 
offerings made exclusively to venture capital firms.  Rodrigues, supra note 4, at 3433–34 (“In other 
words, even with [the Crowdfund Act], the real home runs are still reserved for the big wallets.”).  
See also John S. Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and 
Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 611–12 (2013) 
(noting that crowdfunding investors are more akin to early-stage angel investors than to venture 
capitalists that invest larger amounts in later stages of a company’s development); Kevin Lawton, 
Unlocking the Global Trillion-Dollar Crowdfunding Market, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 24, 2012, 2:30 
PM), http://venturebeat.com/2012/12/24/crowdfunding-market/ (“Having companies that have been 
proven out using crowdfunding will only create better pickings for the venture capital industry to 
come in and scale those startups.” (quoting Manu Kumar, K9 Ventures)). 
 35. See generally Bradford, The New Crowdfunding Exemption, supra note 2 (detailing and 
analyzing the Crowdfund Act’s requirements); Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration 
Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1438–43 (2012) (“Promoters seeking 
to raise small amounts from small investors are now subject to such a wide range of disclosure and 
regulatory requirements . . . .”); Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
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remains an open question whether these measures strike the right regulatory 
balance of freeing entrepreneurs to raise capital with reasonable oversight or 
raising the cost of compliance so high that start-up companies decide not to 
take advantage of crowdfunding.
36
  The open access that crowdfunding 
promises will be realized in practice only after the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the SEC) finalizes the regulations
37
 to implement the 
numerous details of the Act that Congress left to the SEC’s discretion.
38
 
B. Capitalist Tensions in Crowdfunding 
Nonetheless, in principle the Crowdfund Act ambitiously unites 
crowdfunding’s popular, democratic character with the capitalist haven of 
entrepreneurial start-up companies.  It is a challenging union.  Though the 
sacrosanct American principles of democracy and capitalism are often 
intertwined,
39
 the two concepts can be theoretically opposed
40
 and 
                                                          
REV. 1457, 1460–66 (2013) (summarizing the provisions of the Crowdfund Act). 
 36. Compare Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private 
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital-Raising 35 (Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research 
Paper No. 12-119, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2132813 (noting that due to the 
Crowdfund Act’s “quite heavy and costly set of responsibilities . . . it is difficult for us to see why a 
rational start-up entrepreneur would find it appealing to use the new [crowdfunding] exemption at 
all”); with Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1473 (concluding that the Crowdfund Act “stands a good 
chance of lowering the cost of raising relatively small amounts of business capital from the disparate 
public”).  
 37. The Crowdfund Act set a deadline of January 1, 2013 for the SEC to issue the regulations.  
JOBS Act sec. 302(c).  On October 23, 2013, as this article is going to press, the SEC released 
proposed regulations with a 90 day comment period.  Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428-01 
(proposed Oct. 23, 2013) (to be codified as 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249)  
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/33-9470.pdf. 
 38. E.g., JOBS Act sec. 302(b), §§ (a)(12), (b)(5) (authorizing the SEC to require crowdfunding 
intermediaries—i.e., the websites where crowdfunding investments must occur—and issuers to meet 
“such other requirements as the Commission may, by rule, prescribe, for the protection of investors 
and in the public interest”). 
 39.  E.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary 
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 378 (2013) (asserting that “things like 
transparency, accountability, and openness to external voices are expected of large American 
corporations” even though these concepts are from “the world more often populated by 
administrative and constitutional law and political science” and “typically have been characteristics 
of government”); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 164–88 
(1954) (describing corporations’ political role in a capitalist society and arguing that democratic 
principles, such as checks on absolute power, do apply to corporations); MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7–21 (1962) (arguing there is an intimate connection between free 
market capitalism and democratic political freedom); MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF 
DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 14 (1982) (“To begin with, modern democracy and modern capitalism 
proceed from identical historical impulses.”).  See also UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906) 
(chronicling unregulated capitalism and corrupt politics prior to anti-trust and other protective laws, 
and exemplifying how public outcry in a democracy can lead to legal restrictions on corporate 
behavior, such as the pure food and drug laws enacted in response to Sinclair’s exposé). 
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practically incompatible
41
 in certain circumstances, as even the United 
States’ founding fathers recognized.
42
  Democracy celebrates individual 
equality with its one-person-one-vote philosophy while capitalism accepts—
even exalts—economic inequality under its “one-dollar-one-vote 
principle.”
43
  Democracy seeks political stability, balance, and equal rights, 
where capitalism rewards innovation and successful economic risk-taking, 




                                                          
 40.  Securities laws seek to balance democratic and capitalist interests.  See Langevoort & 
Thompson, supra note 39, at 383 (recognizing “the democratic legitimacy of subjecting private 
institutions to greater public transparency” but cautioning that “this attention [should focus] on the 
largest of companies,” not smaller public companies that cannot bear the costs associated with 
extensive regulatory requirements); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate 
Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 66 (1991) (“Concentrated financial capital does not mix well with a 
broad-based egalitarian democracy in which interest groups can acquire great influence . . . .”). 
 41.  E.g., AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS 
ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY, 198 (2003) (asserting that “there is always an inherent 
instability in free market democracy”).  The tension between democracy and capitalism arises, in its 
most elementary and threatening form, from “the confrontation between market wealth held by a few 
and democratic power held by the many. . . .”  Id. at 190.  Thus, “there is always, in any democratic, 
capitalist society a potential conflict between market-generated wealth disparities and majoritarian 
politics.”  Id.  See also Richard Stith, If Dorothy Had Not Had Toto to Pull Back the Wizard’s 
Curtain: The Fabrication of Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 847, 850 (2010) 
(“[C]apitalism prefers property and commerce rights to be immune to the erratic and redistributive 
impulses of popular majorities, for the sake of economic predictability and security.  Global 
capitalism is thus fundamentally anti-democratic, preferring uniform rules favoring capital imposed 
on all nations.”). 
 42.  For example, Alexander Hamilton rejected the capitalist principle of one share, one vote 
because of its undemocratic propensity to allow a few large shareholders to disproportionately 
control and benefit from the Bank of the United States.  Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One 
Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 470 
(2008) (describing Hamilton’s “prudent mean” approach under which a shareholder’s “votes-per-
share would decrease as the individual shareholder got more and more shares; a shareholder with 
five shares might get five votes, but a shareholder with 100 shares might only get ten votes”). 
 43.  HA-JOON CHANG, 23 THINGS THEY DON’T TELL YOU ABOUT CAPITALISM 10 (2010).  
 44.  The strictures of democracy, such as its checks on unilateral power, can hinder the 
government’s response to, and control over, capitalism’s endemic business cycles and concomitant 
economic booms and busts.  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 386–87 
(2010).  Posner noted that John Maynard Keynes “correctly impl[ied] that a totalitarian state can 
control the business cycle more effectively than a democratic one . . . [which] do[es] not make 
totalitarianism superior to democracy or suggest that it is more efficient; judging by the communist 
experience, it is much less efficient, and all in all an odious flop.  But democracy does make it 
difficult . . . to control the business cycle without doing long-term economic damage.  Accordingly, 
the United States has an economic history far more spasmodic and cyclical than American political 
history . . . .  While the U.S. Constitution has proved relatively sturdy and adaptable, it is America’s 
economic life that has been subject to a dynamic of imperial rise and fall . . . .”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  However, “[i]t would be quite radical today even to contemplate imposing on the 
economy the kind of safeguards that the Constitution places on the political system.”  Id.  See also 
TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 301 (2010) 
(observing that “most influential economic thought, from Smith to Keynes to Schumpeter, accepts as 
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Capitalism’s risk and reward paradigm is nowhere more apparent than 
in start-up company investing, where a great majority of companies fail or 
produce middling returns on investment while a select few companies 
achieve extraordinary financial success.
45
  This investing reality has led to a 
hyper-competitive landscape in which relatively small numbers of 
sophisticated, wealthy investors commit large amounts of money to 
confidential, heavily-negotiated investments.
46
  In diametric opposition, 
crowdfunding investment turns the current start-up company investing 
model on its head by empowering large numbers of unsophisticated, retail 




Part III provides a brief overview of the Crowdfund Act and the 
provisions of the Act on which this article focuses.  Then, the remainder of 
the article explores the clash of democratic and capitalist values in 
crowdfunding investments in start-up companies. 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CROWDFUND ACT 
Detailed summaries and analyses of the Crowdfund Act’s provisions 
have been ably set forth elsewhere.
48
  In broad strokes, the Crowdfund Act 
will allow start-up companies and small businesses to raise up to $1 million 
on a twelve-month rolling basis through online capital campaigns.
49
  Any 
                                                          
intrinsic to a free-market system the ravages of boom and bust”); HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING 
AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 9–10, 100–01, 120, 219–20, 287–88 (1986) (arguing that “market 
capitalism is both intrinsically unstable” due to speculative financing, among other factors, “and can 
lead to distasteful distributions of wealth and power”).  See also CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH 
S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009) (chronicling 
sovereign and private financial crises with a focus on the systemic risks of leverage). 
 45.  Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29 (2012) 
(recognizing the “ugly truth [] that most start-ups in [a venture capital] fund will produce no return,” 
so the start-ups “doing well must produce more than a three- to four-fold return to make up for the 
duds”) (emphasis added). 
 46.  See, e.g., J.J. Colao, Fred Wilson and the Death of Venture Capital, FORBES (May 8, 
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jjcolao/2012/05/08/fred-wilson-and-the-death-of-venture-capital/ 
(discussing competition in venture capital markets, including competition from crowdfunders); D. 
Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 337–55 (2005) 
(examining venture capitalist contractual provisions related to exit events); Ronald J. Gilson, 
Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1067, 1076–85 (2003) (analyzing venture capitalist contracting practices). 
 47.  See, e.g., Wroldsen, supra note 34, at 627–28 (discussing the likelihood that non-
negotiated, click-through agreements will become commonplace in crowdfunding investing).  
 48.  See, e.g., Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption, supra note 2. 
 49.  JOBS Act sec. 302(a). 
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Internet investor may participate,
50
 but the amount each investor may invest 
in crowdfunding offerings is capped at an annual amount ranging from 
$2,000 to $100,000 depending on the investor’s annual income or net 
worth.
51
  Companies seeking crowdfunding investment may sell any type of 
security, whether common stock, preferred stock, debentures, or any existing 
or novel combination thereof—such as “unequity,” which is a short-term, 
profit-sharing interest stripped of corporate governance rights.
52
  Further, 
companies must disclose certain information about the offering, such as the 
price and type of securities,
53
 general information about the company and its 
management, risk factors, and tax returns or financial statements depending 
on the size of the offering.
54
 
All crowdfunding investments must occur online through registered 
“funding portals” or traditional broker-dealers, not directly between 
companies and investors.
55
  The funding portals are tasked with a variety of 
regulatory functions, such as educating investors, providing a platform for 
crowdfunding transactions, collecting and disseminating information and 
disclosures, performing background checks, and fulfilling any other 
requirements the SEC establishes.
56
  The Act restricts marketing of 
individual crowdfunding offerings to deter aggressive sales tactics.
57
  It also 
curtails resale of crowdfunded securities for one year other than resale back 
                                                          
 50.  The Crowdfund Act does, however, prevent investment companies from either investing in 
or seeking capital through crowdfunding.  See James J. Williamson, The JOBS Act and Middle-
Income Investors: Why It Doesn’t Go Far Enough, 122 YALE L.J. 2069, 2075–80 (2013) (lamenting 
that the JOBS Act prohibits mutual funds from investing in crowdfunding offerings, thereby 
hindering individual investors from diversifying their crowdfunding investments). 
 51.  JOBS Act sec. 302(a). 
 52.  See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO 
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 335, 360–63 (2012) (discussing novel securities and describing 
unequity interests in the crowdfunding context); Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1482–89 (explaining the 
benefits to crowdfunded companies of offering debt securities instead of equity interests). 
 53.  See Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding’s Curious Conundrum, 7 OHIO 
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 373, 388–415 (2012) (analyzing pricing mechanisms and liabilities 
under the Crowdfund Act). 
 54.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (b)(1)(A)–(H). 
 55.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (a), sec. 304.  See also Joan MacLeod Heminway, The New 
Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals Under the CROWDFUND Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 
177 (2013) (explaining and analyzing funding portals); Karina Sigar, Comment, Fret No More: 
Inapplicability of Crowdfunding Concerns in the Internet Age and the JOBS Act’s Safeguards, 64 
ADMIN. L. REV. 473, 499–502 (2012) (discussing the role of self-regulatory organizations under the 
Crowdfund Act). 
 56.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (a)(1)–(10), sec. 304(b), § (80)(A)–(E). 
 57.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (b)(2).  See also Douglas S. Ellenoff, Making Crowdfunding 
Credible, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 19, 24–25 (2013) (discussing the Act’s marketing and 
investment solicitation restrictions on companies and funding portals). 
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to the company, to accredited investors, or to family members.
58
  And it 
preempts state “blue-sky” regulation of crowdfunding offerings while still 
providing for both state and federal civil actions.
59
 
Beyond the statutory details, though, the Crowdfund Act’s key 
innovation is to invite start-up companies and small businesses to raise 
capital from the general public, regardless of investors’ wealth, knowledge, 
or investing acumen.  As described in Part II, this innovation causes 
capitalist forces to collide with democratic principles.  Parts IV through VI 
illustrate this collision by providing three examples of the novel securities 
law issues that arise under the Crowdfund Act due to the merging of 
democratic participation and capitalist forces in start-up company investing. 
IV. INCORPORATING DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION: ANNUAL 
DISCLOSURES 
A. Preference for Few Investors 
An article in a leading entrepreneurship magazine discusses the capital-
raising efforts and strategy of one start-up company, Sheex, Inc., which 
“makes bedding and sleepwear from performance fabric.”
60
  The article 
accurately captures the approach most start-up companies take to financing 
new ventures: “The rule of thumb when raising funds is, [t]he fewer 
investors, the better.”
61
  Such a rule of thumb favors wealthy investors who 
have more investable funds than less wealthy investors.  From a capitalist 
perspective, the rule of thumb often makes good business sense for start-up 
companies because, among other reasons, managing relationships with fewer 
investors involves lower transaction costs.
62
  But from a democratic 
perspective, the rule of thumb operates to discriminate against less wealthy 
investors—a start-up company that is motivated to minimize the number of 
its investors necessarily seeks higher investment amounts from each 
investor, thereby favoring wealthy investors who can afford to invest more 
than less wealthy investors.
63
 
                                                          
 58.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (e). 
 59.  JOBS Act sec. 305; JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (c).  
 60.  April Joyner, The More, the Merrier? The Benefits and Drawbacks of Having a Laundry 
List of Investors, INC., July–Aug. 2012, at 92–94. 
 61.  Id. at 92. 
 62.  See Rodrigues, supra note 4, at 3432 (noting that transaction costs alone would drive firms 
toward fewer investors, each of whom invests a large amount). 
 63.  See id. at 3413 (noting that “the private market, with its promise of outsized returns, is the 
exclusive preserve of the accredited investor”). 
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Furthermore, securities laws enhance this discrimination by making it 
much easier for start-up companies to raise funds from wealthy, accredited 
investors than from less wealthy, retail investors.
64
  In addition to favoring 
wealthy investors, securities laws also discourage private companies from 
having a large number of investors.
65
  Securities laws require private 
companies with more than $10 million in assets to comply with certain 
public company reporting obligations
66
 once the number of the company’s 
shareholders “of record” reaches either 500 unaccredited investors or 2,000 
total investors.
67
  Prior to the JOBS Act, the threshold was even lower: 




Crowdfunding, however, represents a paradigm shift from the reigning 
model that encourages start-up companies to have few investors.  For 
example, the Sheex article emphasized that the company founders bucked 
                                                          
 64.  Though securities laws and regulations did not involve “a conspiracy to keep the average 
Joe out of the private market,” the practical effect has been to favor accredited investors.  See 
Rodrigues, supra note 4, at 3417–22.  For example, offerings to accredited investors under Rule 506 
can be for an unlimited dollar amount and generally do not require disclosures.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506 
(2013).  In contrast, offerings to unaccredited investors under Rule 504 can amount to no more than 
$1,000,000 and can only be to people with whom the issuer has a preexisting relationship—e.g., 
friends and family.  17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (2013). 
 65.  See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Questioning the 500 Equity Holder Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. ONLINE 43, 43–44 (2011), available at http://www.hblr.org/?p=1028 (describing how 
securities law reporting requirements motivated Google and Facebook to go public before they 
otherwise would have because each company surpassed the 500 shareholders “of record” threshold 
that was then applicable). 
 66.  Id. (discussing the disclosure and reporting obligations that become applicable once a 
company surpasses the asset size and shareholder of record thresholds, and concluding that 
“[b]asically, the company has the same SEC obligations as a public company but does not receive 
the benefits of going public, principally a large infusion of equity capital and liquidity for its stock”). 
 67.  15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (2012).  Certain shareholders are not counted as shareholders “of 
record,” such as employees who obtained shares through an employee compensation plan that was 
exempt from public registration requirements.  JOBS Act § 502.  Furthermore, the number of 
shareholders of record often grossly understates the actual number of a company’s shareholders.  For 
example, if 100 individual shareholders own shares of a company through the same brokerage firm, 
or through different brokerage firms that all use the same depository company to hold the shares, 
then the SEC only counts the brokerage firm, or the depository company, as one shareholder.  E.g., 
Gubler, supra note 4, at 766–68 (discussing the SEC’s narrow interpretation of the term “held of 
record,” resulting in each brokerage’s depository account, not each beneficial owner, being counted 
as a shareholder of record); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 39, at 349, 355–61 (explaining that 
the shareholders “of record” measurement has become “disconnected from any economic reality and 
somewhat manipulable”).  The understating of the number of a company’s shareholders may be less 
pronounced in crowdfunding to the extent crowdfunding investors purchase shares directly from the 
company instead of through brokers because each beneficial owner would be counted as a 
shareholder of record. 
 68.  See Michael D. Guttentag, Patching a Hole from the JOBS Act: How and Why to Rewrite 
the Rules that Require Firms to Make Periodic Disclosures, 88 IND. L.J. 151, 164–78 (2013) 
(chronicling the history of the shareholder of record threshold). 
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the trend of preferring few investors by raising $9.1 million from 69 
investors, marveling that 69 is a large number of investors for a start-up 
company.
69
  In a successful crowdfunding offering, though, the 69 investors 
that represented an atypically large number of start-up company investors in 
Sheex’s case could easily increase by several orders of magnitude and 
become 6,900, 69,000, or even 690,000 or more crowdfunding investors.
70
 
For instance, prior to the Crowdfund Act, one U.S. crowdfunding 
campaign netted pledges from over 5 million people to invest a total of $200 
million to purchase Pabst Brewing Company, though the SEC required the 
campaign to close before consummating the transaction because the 
campaign failed to comply with securities laws.
71
  A different Internet stock 
offering in the U.S. that did comply with securities laws prior to the 
Crowdfund Act raised nearly $2 million from approximately 3,500 
investors.
72
  In the U.K., some 20,000 people contributed approximately £35 
each to raise more than £700,000 to purchase a professional soccer team.
73
  
And in Spain, an international campaign fueled by Twitter helped a Spanish 
soccer club avoid bankruptcy by raising more than €1.57 million from over 




Thus, whereas 69 investors may be an abnormally high number of 
investors for a start-up company that does not rely on crowdfunding, it is 
merely the tip of the iceberg for successful crowdfunding offerings.  Even 
so, the Sheex example is instructive for crowdfunding offerings because it 
illustrates the types of legal rights that investors and entrepreneurs negotiate 
                                                          
 69.  Joyner, supra note 60, at 92 (exclaiming that the Sheex co-founders raised capital “from 
69—yes, 69—investors” while discussing the advantages and disadvantages of raising start-up funds 
from a large number of investors). 
 70.  See, e.g., supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text (citing examples of the number of 
participants in non-equity crowdfunding campaigns); infra notes 170–74 and accompanying text 
(discussing the number of investors in Internet stock offerings). 
 71.  Cease-and-Desist Order for Michael Migliozzi II & Brian William Flatow, Securities Act 
Release No. 9216 (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/33-
9216.pdf. 
 72.  Pope, supra note 28, at 978–79 (explaining that Spring Street Brewing Company’s direct 
public offering was conducted in accordance with Regulation A). 
 73.  HOWE, supra note 7, at 255.  See also Society Rules, MYFOOTBALLCLUB, 
http://www.myfootballclub.co.uk/society-rules (last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (offering each 
contributor one nontransferable voting share in the entity that owns the EbbsFleet United soccer 
team, along with information rights to view the team’s financial data and the opportunity to become 
one of the team’s seven directors).   
 74.  Ken Belson, Effort to Save Soccer Club Sweeps Globe, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/sports/soccer/last-ditch-effort-to-save-real-oviedo-soccer-club-
sweeps-globe.html.  See also Historia, WEB OFICIAL REAL OVIEDO, http://www.realoviedo.es/es/el-
club/historia/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
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as the number of shareholders increases.  Sheex broke with the status quo to 
have 69 angel investors instead of a handful of venture capitalist investors 
because the company founders wanted to maintain majority control of the 
company.
75
  A larger number of angel investors, each of whom invested a 
lower amount than a venture capitalist would have invested, did not demand 
the control rights that venture capitalists would have required.
76
  Sheex did 
agree, however, to provide quarterly business updates to all investors.
77
  And 
in place of the expertise and hands-on management that venture capitalists 




The Sheex example helps reveal on a small scale the novel legal issues 
that the Crowdfund Act is forced to confront on a large scale when bringing 
the democratic masses of retail investors into the private world of investing 
in start-up companies.  As explained in Part IV.B below, Sheex’s 
commitment to provide quarterly reports to its angel investors is analogous 
to the Crowdfund Act’s unique annual disclosure requirement for 
crowdfunded start-up companies.  Furthermore, Sheex’s decision to retain 
majority control and forego the expertise of venture capitalist experts hints at 
the possibility that crowdfunded companies could benefit from the insights 
of many less expert advisors through the wisdom of the crowd, as explored 
in Part V. 
B. Obligations to Many Investors 
The Crowdfund Act includes a unique requirement that crowdfunded 
companies make ongoing disclosures to crowdfunding investors on at least 
an annual basis.
79
  Specifically, each year crowdfunded companies must 
disclose to investors and the SEC a “report[] of the results of [the 
company’s] operations and financial statements . . . subject to such 
                                                          
 75.  Joyner, supra note 60, at 92 (“Despite the pie’s being split into so many slices, [the co-
founders] have managed to maintain a majority of their company—50.1  percent to be exact . . . .”). 
 76.  Id. (explaining that “the valuations [the co-founders] were being offered [by the venture 
capitalists] would force them to surrender control of the business, an outcome [the co-founders] felt 
wasn’t fair to them or their early investors”). 
 77.  Id. at 94. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (b)(4).  The Commission is directed to determine whether annual 
or more frequent reports are appropriate and the duration of such ongoing reporting requirement.  Id.  
See also Andrew A. Schwartz, Keep It Light, Chairman White: SEC Rulemaking Under the 
Crowdfund Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC, 43, 53–55 (2013) (discussing the frequency of periodic 
reports and potential termination dates for ongoing disclosures). 
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exceptions . . . as the [SEC] may establish, by rule.”
80
  The Crowdfund Act’s 
ongoing disclosure requirement breaks new ground in regulating the 
relationship between investors and managers of small companies.  No other 
securities law exemption for start-up companies, and not even the disclosure 
requirements for a mini-public offering under Regulation A, include an 
ongoing periodic disclosure requirement.
81
  Before the Crowdfund Act, 
securities laws required only public companies, or private companies that 
exceeded the asset-size and shareholders-of-record thresholds discussed 
above,
82
 to provide ongoing periodic reports to shareholders.
83
 
The general public’s participation in crowdfunding offerings explains 
why the Crowdfund Act’s ongoing disclosure requirement makes sense.  The 
Act anticipates many crowdfunding investors in a crowdfunded company, 
just as a public company has many investors.  Therefore, conceptually it is 
logical to extend appropriate public company reporting requirements to 
crowdfunded companies.  Of course, though crowdfunded companies may 
have many shareholders, like public companies, crowdfunded companies are 
                                                          
 80.  Sec. 302(b), § (b)(4).  When a company offers securities through crowdfunding, the 
company must disclose its financial statements and income tax returns, with varying levels of 
certifications and audits depending on the amount of money the company seeks to raise.  Id. § 
(b)(1)(D).  If the company seeks to raise $100,000 or less, the company must disclose its financial 
statements with certification by the principal executive officer that they are “true and complete in all 
material respects,” as well as the company’s income tax returns.  Id. § (b)(1)(D)(i).  If the company 
seeks more than $100,000 and less than $500,000, then it must disclose “financial statements 
reviewed by a[n] [independent] public accountant”—pursuant to “standards and procedures” that the 
SEC is instructed to provide.  Id. § (b)(1)(D)(ii).  If the company seeks more than $500,000—unless 
the SEC establishes a different amount—it must disclose “audited financial statements.”  Id. § 
(b)(1)(D)(iii).  Apart from the annual disclosure requirements, at the time of the initial crowdfunding 
offering companies must make several one-time disclosures.  Id. § (b)(1).  The one-time disclosures 
include straightforward information, such as names and contact information of the company and 
certain key employees and owners, as well as a “description of the [company’s] business,” “business 
plan,” “financial condition,” and the “intended use of the [investment] proceeds.”  Id. 
 81.  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2013); Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 566 (2012) (noting that a public offering under Regulation A “does not 
automatically trigger ongoing reporting obligations”).  See also Rodrigues, supra note 4, at 3426 
(“[M]andatory disclosure requirements apply to the public markets alone.”).  But the JOBS Act 
directs the SEC to create a new regulation for offerings up to $50 million—informally known as 
Regulation A+ because Regulation A offerings are capped at $5 million—and grants the SEC 
discretion to require issuers that rely on Regulation A+ to file periodic disclosures.  See JOBS Act 
sec. 401(b)(2), §§ (2)–(4). 
 82.  See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. 
 83.  Guttentag, supra note 68, at 162–64.  The scope of the periodic disclosure requirements of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was limited to “firms with securities traded on a national 
exchange.”  Id. at 164.  Since 1934, “the criteria used to determine which firms should be required to 
comply with [ongoing periodic disclosure requirements] have been changed only on rare occasion.”  
Id. at 164–65 (discussing four changes in the criteria since 1934).  See also Langevoort & 
Thompson, supra note 39, at 344–45 (describing how stocks traded in “over-the-counter (OTC) 
markets” but not on a national exchange can also be subject to ongoing disclosure obligations). 
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small, private enterprises with nowhere near the resources of a public 
company.
84
  Accordingly, the Crowdfund Act requires only limited annual 
disclosures; whereas, public companies must comply not only with more 




The Crowdfund Act also wisely excludes crowdfunding investors from 
the calculation of the number of shareholders of record.
86
  As a result, a 
crowdfunded company is not subject to public company reporting 
obligations if it exceeds 500 unaccredited or 2,000 total shareholders of 
record through crowdfunding offerings, which many crowdfunded 
companies are likely to do.  Instead, crowdfunded companies simply must 
continue to comply with the Crowdfund Act’s annual disclosure 
requirement. 
The Crowdfund Act’s innovation of requiring a private company to 
provide ongoing disclosures to investors on at least an annual basis is a 
foreseeable outcome of integrating crowdfunding’s democratic characteristic 
of widespread participation into the private-company realm of start-up 
company investing.  Also, eschewing more onerous public company 
reporting requirements for the middle ground of one annual disclosure 
obligation respects a small company’s limited resources, while also honoring 
the importance of providing numerous minority investors with information 
about the company.
87
  A legal requirement that crowdfunded companies 
make annual disclosures is also appropriate because crowdfunding investors, 
due to the small size of each investment, their minority ownership position, 
and the collective-action problems that arise from the dispersed and 
                                                          
 84.  See JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (f)(2).  The Crowdfund Act targets small companies.  Large 
companies—those that must “file reports pursuant to section 13 or section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934”—are not eligible to sell securities through crowdfunding.  Id.   
 85.  Public companies are subject to many more disclosure requirements than what the 
Crowdfund Act requires.  See generally, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (including numerous requirements); Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (requiring quarterly and annual 
reports—Forms 10-Q and 10-K, respectively—and reports triggered by particular corporate events—
Form 8-K—in addition to other requirements); Gubler, supra note 4, at 762–63 (summarizing public 
company “compliance costs and liability costs”); Schwartz, supra note 81, at 583–90 (providing an 
overview of the most onerous and costly provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act).  
 86.  JOBS Act sec. 303(a), § (6).  In contrast, a private company with assets greater than $10 
million that sells stock under Regulation D or Regulation A, for instance, will become subject to 
applicable public company reporting requirements once it exceeds 500 unaccredited or 2,000 total 
shareholders of record because no exception applies to Regulation D or Regulation A offerings.  Id. 
§§ (A)(i)–(ii). 
 87.  Rodrigues, supra note 4, at 3427 (describing the two “traditional justifications for 
mandatory disclosure—efficiency in scale and the utility of the public good of information”).   
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impersonal nature of crowdfunding,
88
 will likely lack the clout to negotiate 
appropriate information rights on their own.
89
 
Notwithstanding the Crowdfund Act’s commendable attempt to balance 
the democratic interest that many investors have in receiving information 
against the constraints of a small company’s limited resources, the 
requirement that companies make one annual disclosure to investors might 
not be the best approach.  Instead, a series of less detailed but more frequent 
disclosures might better serve the interests of investors and be more cost-
effective for companies to provide.  Also, more frequent disclosures would 
more closely track venture capitalists’ start-up company investment strategy 
of monitoring the progress of a portfolio company through ongoing 
communication with company management.
90
  Especially if crowdfunding 
laws incorporate the interactive communication requirement between 
company management and investors discussed in Part V below, then a legal 
requirement of short, simple, and frequent communications over the Internet 
could be more helpful to investors and more cost-effective for companies 
than one annual disclosure. 
V. REJECTING DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION: WISDOM OF THE CROWD 
Although the Crowdfund Act sensibly incorporates democratic 
participation by requiring crowdfunded companies to make ongoing 
disclosures to crowdfunding investors, the Act misses the opportunity to 
integrate into crowdfunding investment laws a native democratic virtue of 
crowdfunding, known as the wisdom of the crowd.
91
  Crowdfunding 
demands a different regulatory paradigm because the Crowdfund Act 
introduces open and democratic access into the historically private realm of 
start-up company investing.  Before crowdfunding, the paradigm for 
                                                          
 88.  Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 39, at 364 (“Required disclosure is more valuable 
(and necessary) in the presence of dispersed shareholdings facing a collective-action problem.”). 
 89.  See James D. Cox, Premises for Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings: An 
Essay, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2000, at 11, 13.  Institutional investors have the ability, 
“through their bargaining power, [to] extract from issuers the information they . . . require” to inform 
their investment decisions, and there is a “greater need for regulatory paternalism” where “the 
market includes investors who lack the resources effectively to extract from the issuer the type of 
information that” institutional investors can demand.  Id.  “Mandatory disclosure thus takes over 
when self-help is not believed possible.”  Id.  See also Wroldsen, supra note 34, at 614–15 
(analyzing leverage imbalances in crowdfunding investment negotiations). 
 90.  See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 46, at 1072–73 (discussing venture capitalists’ “intensive 
monitoring of the portfolio company’s performance”). 
 91.  Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption, supra note 2, at 219–20.  See also 
supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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regulating start-up company investments focused on stock offerings either to 
a small group of friends and family
92
 or to sophisticated venture capitalists 
that carefully negotiated and monitored their large investments.
93
 
But the post-crowdfunding regulatory paradigm must adjust to and 
account for crowdfunding’s revolutionary change that allows start-up 
companies to offer securities to the general public over the Internet—
inviting small individual investments from many potentially unsophisticated 
investors who do not have a preexisting relationship with the issuer.  
Fortunately, existing crowdfunding and crowdsourcing practices in areas 
outside of investments in securities have already developed the new 
regulatory paradigm: reliance on the wisdom of the crowd.
94
  All that is 
missing is for crowdfunding laws to catch up. 
For a while it looked as if the Crowdfund Act would include the wisdom 
of the crowd in its regulatory approach: a legal requirement aimed at 
developing the wisdom of the crowd was included in two early 
crowdfunding bills
95
 that Congress discussed prior to hastily drafting and 
passing the bill that became the Crowdfund Act.
96
  For example, one of the 
early bills required funding portals—the websites where crowdfunding 
investments occur—
97
to “make[] available . . . a method of communication 
that permits the issuer and investors to communicate with one another,”
98
 
                                                          
 92.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2013) (allowing “[e]xemption[s] for limited offerings and sales of 
securities not exceeding $1,000,000”). 
 93.  See id. § 230.506 (allowing “[e]xemption[s] for limited offers and sales without regard to 
dollar amount of offering”). 
 94.  See Ellenoff, supra note 57, at 24 (noting that “the role of the crowd has been important, 
active, and lively” in other countries’ crowdfunding experiences, according to the owners of 
crowdfunding sites in the United Kingdom and Australia). 
 95.  Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. Res. 2930, 112th Cong. (2011); Democratizing 
Access to Capital Act of 2011, S. Res. 1791, 112th Cong.  
 96.  See Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption, supra note 2, at 216 (describing 
the short timeframe in which the Crowdfund Act was passed and noting that many of the provisions 
that became the Crowdfund Act were not “subjected to committee hearings or markup” and “clearly 
could have benefited from more thorough consideration and markup”). 
 97.  See JOBS Act sec. 302(a), § (6)(C) (mentioning funding portals).  See also Heminway, 
supra note 55, at 179.  In addition to funding portals, registered brokers are permitted to facilitate 
crowdfunding investments.  Id.  This article addresses funding portals’ role in crowdfunding 
investment.  The implications of brokers’ involvement with crowdfunding, and the potential 
differences between brokers and funding portals in how each might approach crowdfunding, are 
beyond the scope of this article.  Others have noted, however, that including brokers “raises a serious 
sales pressure concern—a marginal issuer can find a marginal broker to do cold-call telephone 
solicitations and invoke the exemption from mandatory disclosure and state regulation.  Obviously, 
this is far distant from the vision said to justify crowdfunding; those cold calls (or e-mail spam) will 
be exposed to neither a crowd nor much likelihood of any wisdom.”  Thompson & Langevoort, 
supra note 36, at 36. 
 98.  Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. Res. 2930, 112th Cong. sec. 2(b), § (a)(12) 
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such as posting on Internet message boards.
99
  Unfortunately, the bill that 
became the Crowdfund Act remained silent on an interactive communication 
requirement, and thus no provision relating to the wisdom of the crowd was 
included in the Crowdfund Act.
100
 
A requirement of Internet dialogue between company management and 
potential crowdfunding investors would help create a forum for the wisdom 
of the crowd to probe the merits of a crowdfunding offering.
101
  Such a 
forum would allow investors themselves to assist the SEC in ferreting out 
fraudulent offerings and increasing transparency in crowdfunding 
investments: “[a]n open communications platform will help to prevent fraud 
by allowing investors with particular knowledge about an offering or an 
issuer to communicate it to other investors . . . [and] will lead to better-
informed investors.”
102
  Indeed, “[d]ialogue . . . has a long pedigree in 
philosophy as a means to truth,”
103
 and facilitating dialogue between issuers 





 and subject issuers to liability
106
 for false or misleading statements. 
                                                          
(2011).  See also Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 28, at 134–
36 (recommending similar functionality). 
 99.  Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption, supra note 2, at 219–20 (criticizing 
the Act’s failure to include interactive communication requirements that would facilitate 
development of the wisdom of the crowd). 
 100.  See id.  Ironically, the Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act was widely denounced as 
“lack[ing] . . . investor protections.”  Wroldsen, supra note 34, at 598–99.  But when the Senate 
created its version of a crowdfunding law with more investor protections, it neglected the protection 
that the Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act had included in the form of an interactive 
communication tool to aid in developing the wisdom of the crowd.  See supra note 99. 
 101.  158 CONG. REC. S1884-01 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown) 
(arguing that “[a]ll the experts agree that we would need to require an intermediary, say, like an 
eBay, where the crowd can help identify the good and bad players, the way that eBay uses [sic] 
identified bad sellers on their [sic] site”). 
 102.  Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 28, at 134. 
 103.  Abner S. Greene, Against Interpretive Obligation (to the Supreme Court), 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1661, 1665–66 (2006).  See also Keith Werhan, The Classical Athenian Ancestry of American 
Freedom of Speech, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 325–26 (2008) (footnotes omitted) (recognizing 
Plato’s use of dialogue to challenge assumptions: “[b]y the end of the dialogue, Socrates typically 
had exposed the pretensions of those who had clung dogmatically to conventional wisdom. . . . 
Socrates insisted that community leaders allow their beliefs to be tested in adversarial dialogue, and 
to revise their understanding of the truth if they are refuted. . . .”). 
 104.  See Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 28, at 114–15 
(recognizing that crowdfunding investment has not been studied exhaustively, but arguing that 
“unsophisticated crowdfunding investors are likely to become more sophisticated over time” and 
noting one study that revealed crowdfunders under the interest-bearing loan model “moved from 
lower-performing loans to loans with a higher rate of return” during a two year period). 
 105.  158 CONG. REC. S1884-01 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley) 
(arguing that the twenty-one day offering period, instead of the one day period allowed under a 
different crowdfunding bill, was necessary to “give time for some sort of feedback loops regarding 
any sort of fraudulent activity”). 
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Admittedly, Internet dialogue by itself has its weaknesses.  As even 
casual Internet users know, inapplicable comments and useless blather 
proliferate on the Internet.  But public discussion is also a hallmark of 
deliberative democracy
107
 and the belief that “it is members of the general 
public, not government, who are in a better position to arrive at an objective 
and fair conclusion as to the merits of any new idea or theory.”
108
  
Furthermore, “[o]ne of the lessons of crowdsourcing is that a diverse group 
of less-expert decision-makers can often make better choices than an expert 
working individually.”
109
  Therefore, “[i]t is at least possible that 
crowdfunding investors will do a better job compared to venture capitalists 
and angel investors than their relative lack of sophistication would 
predict.”
110
  Accordingly, crowdfunding laws should create a framework 
designed to help provide investors with the opportunity to leverage the 
                                                          
 106.  The Crowdfund Act expressly provides for liability under section 12 of the Securities Act 
of 1933 for misstatements and omissions.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (c).  See generally Commission 
Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,862, 45,873 (Aug. 7, 2008) (stating 
that Internet postings “will not be treated differently from other company statements when it comes 
to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws”); Marc R. Packer, Corporate Governance 
Feature: Using Social Media Technology in Proxy Solicitations, 13 M & A LAW. No. 5, May 2009, 
at 12 (discussing SEC guidance on potential liability resulting from “the application of the federal 
securities laws to electronic communications”). 
 107.  See, e.g., Werhan, supra note 103, at 324 (identifying Justices Holmes, John Stuart Mill, 
and Pericles as believing “that collective acceptance or rejection of any idea after free debate was the 
best that any society could do in approximating truth”); Christopher T. Wonnell, Truth and the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 669, 724 (1986) (observing that “there does seem to be 
reason to hope that a citizenry enriched by the need to make its own practical decisions will develop 
over time at least a modest critical faculty for evaluating the claims of speakers”). 
 108.  Keith Dubick, The Theoretical Foundation for Protecting Freedom of Expression, 13 
NAT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 23 (2001) (discussing the marketplace of ideas theory); see also Cathrine 
Wells Hantzis, Legal Innovation within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: the Pragmatism of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 583, 589 (1988) (noting Justice Holmes’s “confidence 
in the jury rests upon the accumulated experience” of practical people and his “recognition of the 
legitimacy of an ‘external’ [as opposed to an insider’s] perspective”). 
 109.  Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 28, at 114.  See also 
SUROWIECKI, supra note 6, at xvii (“If you put together a big enough and diverse enough group of 
people and ask them to ‘make decisions affecting matters of general interest,’ that group’s decisions 
will, over time, be ‘intellectually [superior] to the isolated individual,’ no matter how smart or well-
informed he is.”); HOWE, supra note 7, at 134 (observing that the crowd’s results can “seem 
counterintuitive” and that, “[a]s is often said of Wikipedia, collective intelligence works better in 
practice than it does in theory”). 
 110.  Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 28, at 114.  See also 
Institutional Limited Partners Must Accept Blame for Poor Long-Term Returns from Venture 
Capital, Says New Kauffman Report: After Fees and Expenses, Most Investors Will Do Better in 
Public Markets, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.kauffman.org/newsroom/institutional-limited-partners-must-accept-blame-for-poor-long-
term-returns-from-venture-capital.aspx (“Over the past decade, public stock markets have 
outperformed the average venture capital fund and for 15 years, VC funds have failed to return to 
investors the significant amounts of cash invested, despite high-profile successes . . . .”). 
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wisdom of the crowd in selecting and monitoring start-up company 
investments. 
Though developing the wisdom of the crowd through interactive 
communication should not be the sole means of protecting crowdfunding 
investors, crowdfunding laws should not ignore or discard the wisdom of the 
crowd, which the Crowdfund Act does.  Parts V.A and V.B describe the 
application of the wisdom of the crowd to crowdfunding investments.  Then 
Part V.C discusses why crowdfunding laws should include provisions 
related to the wisdom of the crowd instead of relying solely on market 
dynamics to guide the wisdom of the crowd. 
This article does not suggest that government—i.e., the SEC—micro-
manage the actual development of the wisdom of the crowd.  The SEC 
should not prescribe the exact content or frequency of investor or issuer 
communications or the particular technology used to facilitate interaction.  
More simply, as explained in Part V.C., this article advocates for 
crowdfunding laws that create a framework to facilitate market competition 
between private businesses—i.e., the registered funding portals where 
crowdfunding investments occur—on the basis of effective incorporation of 
technology that enhances the wisdom of the crowd.
111
 
A. Characteristics of Wise Crowds 
For the wisdom of the crowd to be effective and the crowd’s judgment 
to be accurate, the crowd should possess four characteristics: (1) “diversity 
of opinion,” (2) “independence,” (3) “decentralization,” and (4) a 
mechanism for aggregating individual judgments.
112
  The first characteristic, 
diversity of opinion,
113
 and the third characteristic, decentralization, will 
likely be true of crowdfunding investors because crowdfunding is open to 
                                                          
 111.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 15 (noting that “a free market does not of course 
eliminate the need for government” and recognizing that “government is essential both as a forum 
for determining the ‘rules of the game’ and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided 
on”). 
 112.  SUROWIECKI, supra note 6, at 10 (asserting that wise crowds share four characteristics: 
“diversity of opinion (each person should have some private information, even if it’s just an 
eccentric interpretation of known facts), independence (people’s opinions are not determined by the 
opinions of those around them), decentralization (people are able to specialize and draw on local 
knowledge), and aggregation (some mechanism exists for turning private judgments into a collective 
decision)”). 
 113.  Deliberation among groups that lack diversity tends to lead to extremism, not wisdom.  
Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 263, 
267–70 (2009).  To the extent a non-diverse subgroup of the general public represents the only 
participants in crowdfunding investment, the group’s wisdom will be impaired. 
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the general public, which is by definition a diverse and decentralized group.  
The second characteristic, independence, might not always be true of 
crowdfunding investors because the opinions of some investors will 
undoubtedly influence the decisions of other investors.  A crowd’s 
vulnerability to a herd instinct or “group think” will tend to erode the quality 
of its decisions, but the possibility that independence may be compromised 
is not unique to crowdfunding investment, as publicly-traded securities can 
be similarly affected.
114
  One study of a crowdfunding market for mobile 
applications (apps) found evidence of rational herding among crowdfunding 
investors: reputable and experienced investors were the first to invest in 
successful apps, and less knowledgeable investors (the crowd) tended to 
follow the lead of more knowledgeable investors.
115
 
The fourth characteristic of a wise crowd, aggregation of individual 
judgments, is often accomplished through market price.  In an open market, 
like the market for publicly-traded securities, the market price is a built-in 
aggregator of the crowd’s wisdom—i.e., the “price discovery” mechanism—
because it represents the price at which sellers and buyers are collectively 
willing to transact.
116
  But crowdfunded securities, unlike publicly-traded 
securities, will not be freely tradable in an open market because the 
Crowdfund Act restricts resale of crowdfunded securities.
117
  Therefore, the 
price of crowdfunded securities will not automatically reflect the collective 
judgment of all crowdfunding investors because there will only be one 
                                                          
 114.  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 6, at 229–30, 249–58 (discussing herd instincts and market 
hysteria in stock market bubbles and crashes); Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 36, at 36 (noting 
that “the wisdom of crowds literature stresses that open communication also has a downside, 
introducing the risk of contagion of information (or bias) that undermines the ‘averaging’ effect of 
many independent beliefs”). 
 115.  Keongtae Kim & Siva Viswanathan, The Experts in the Crowd: The Role of Reputable 
Investors in a Crowdfunding Market 8 (November 2013) (unpublished manuscript) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258243 (noting also that the particular 
crowdfunding market, Appbackr, incentivized early investment by allowing early investors to share 
in profits before later investors).   
 116.  Cherry & Rogers, supra note 19, at 838 (noting that a stock price “encodes a significant 
amount of information” through its aggregating, “price discovery” capabilities). 
 117.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (e).  Resale of crowdfunded securities, like resale of other non-
public securities, may occur through private sales to accredited investors or Qualified Institutional 
Buyers (QIBs) pursuant to securities law exemptions such as Rule 144 and Rule 144A.  See Gubler, 
supra note 4, at 760 (explaining that “the law surrounding resale of restricted [non-publicly-traded] 
securities make these securities less freely tradable than securities in the public market”); Elizabeth 
Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 179, 189–91 (2012) 
(describing securities law exemptions for resale of non-public securities).  With the increasing 
popularity of secondary market transactions over the Internet, a market for resale of securities of 
successful crowdfunded companies could develop.  See generally id. at 193–202 (explaining the 
functionality, risks, and benefits of the leading Internet secondary markets, SecondMarket and 
SharesPost). 
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seller, the issuer, and pessimistic investors cannot balance optimistic 
investors in setting a market price.
118
 
One minor caveat is that the Crowdfund Act allows issuers to state “the 
method for determining the price” of its shares before establishing “the final 
price” of the crowdfunded shares.
119
  Thus, issuers could conceivably set up 
a bidding system to let the collective judgment of potential investors 
influence the final price of the crowdfunded shares, but such a system is not 
required and may be unduly complex for crowdfunding offerings.  As 
discussed below, however, an open market that automatically aggregates 
investors’ preferences through a stock price is not the only way to aggregate 
a crowd’s wisdom or measure market efficiency.
120
 
B. Efficient Markets and Crowdfunding 
The efficient market hypothesis
121
 highlights another important 
distinction between publicly-traded securities and crowdfunded securities.  
In an efficient market, such as the market for well-known publicly-traded 
securities,
122
 information about the issuer is plentiful and market price 
                                                          
 118.  See SUROWIECKI, supra note 6, at 227–28 (arguing that short-selling—the ability of 
pessimistic investors to bet on a declining share price—is an important characteristic of accurate 
price discovery in financial markets); Kevin A. Crisp, Giving Investors Short Shrift: How Short Sale 
Constraints Decrease Market Efficiency and a Modest Proposal for Letting More Shorts Go Naked, 
8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 135, 141 (2008) (asserting that “constraints on short sales mute market 
pessimists so that price inflates above that dictated by the average investor expectation”). 
 119.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (b)(1)(G). 
 120.  For instance, websites that facilitate resale of private company stock to sophisticated 
investors over the Internet provide aggregative services in an attempt to help investors make more 
informed decisions and more accurately price transactions where few public disclosures are available 
and few buyers and sellers interact to establish a market price.  One of these sites “aggregates 
information about not only recent trade prices, but also posted interest in future transactions, 
valuations reflected in third-party research, and ‘premoney’ valuations in earlier venture capital 
rounds for the issuer.”  Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 39, at 349–50.  For in-depth 
discussions of the emergence and risks of the websites that facilitate these secondary market 
transactions among sophisticated investors, see Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 15–35, and Pollman, 
supra note 117, at 193–221. 
 121.  Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 480–84 (2003) (describing the efficient market 
hypothesis and its impact on securities laws and regulations); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors 
Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 302–03 (2000) [hereinafter, Choi, 
Regulating Investors Not Issuers] (referencing three “versions of the efficient markets hypothesis: 
the strong version, the semistrong version, and the weak version”). 
 122.  Some public markets are more efficient than others.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Company 
Registration: Toward a Status-Based AntiFraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 578–79 (1997) 
[hereinafter Choi, Company Registration] (explaining how securities laws “partially take[] into 
account the range in the efficiency of trading markets for different companies’ securities”). 
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quickly incorporates investors’ reactions to new information.
123
  Data is 
processed efficiently in large part due to the many investors—retail, 
professional, and institutional—that follow well-known stocks and the many 
market analysts and news outlets that continually examine market 
information related to those stocks.
124
 
But the explanatory power of the efficient market hypothesis in public 
markets decreases when applied to small, start-up companies because there 
is less information available about start-up companies and fewer market 
analysts and investors following them.
125
  Prior to crowdfunding investment, 
stock offerings of start-up companies were typically made only to small 
groups of sophisticated investors, such as venture capitalists.
126
  And venture 
capitalists can overcome the general market inefficiencies of investing in 
start-up company stock through intensive due diligence, research, and 
personal interaction with company founders.
127
  But crowdfunding opens a 
new and unique channel for selling stock in start-up companies because 
crowdfunding sales are not made to small groups of sophisticated investors, 
but rather to the general public. 
Unlike private offerings of start-up company stock to sophisticated 
venture capitalists, crowdfunding offerings are unregistered “initial public 
offerings,” or “direct public offerings,” in the sense that they will be a 
company’s first offering directed to the general public.  Of course, a 
crowdfunding offering will be on a much smaller scale than a registered 
initial public offering (IPO) of a company whose securities will become 
publicly traded,
128
 but both types of offerings lack the benefit of an efficient 
                                                          
 123.  Paredes, supra note 121, at 480; SUROWIECKI, supra note 6, at 253 (describing a study that 
found that publicly-traded stocks moved “higher in the first fifteen seconds” after a positive report 
aired on a popular stock market television program and “the number of stock trades sextupled in the 
first minute”). 
 124.  Paredes, supra note 121, at 431–32 (“Realistically, few people expect the ‘average’ 
individual investor to focus in any detail on the information that companies disclose.  As a practical 
matter, a company’s disclosures are largely ‘filtered’ through experts—various securities 
professionals and financial intermediaries—who research and process the information and whose 
trades and recommendations ultimately set securities prices.”). 
 125.  Pollman, supra note 117, at 208–11 (observing that little information is known about early-
stage companies that have not attracted much public attention); Gubler, supra note 4, at 798 (noting 
that “less efficient disclosure leads to less efficient stock prices”); Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 18 
(remarking that “[c]ommon stock in start-ups is notoriously difficult to value”). 
 126.  Rodrigues, supra note 4, at 3397–98. 
 127.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See, e.g., 2012 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N Y.B. 52 fig. 5.03 [hereinafter NVCA 
Y.B.], available at http://www.finansedlainnowacji.pl/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/NVCA-
Yearbook-2012.pdf (listing statistics on IPOs from 1985 through 2011, including the median 
offering amounts, such as $97 million in 2011 and $83 million in 2010).  
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market at the time of the initial public sale.
129
  Apart from the differing size 
of the offerings, there are at least two other important distinctions between 
an IPO and a crowdfunding offering.  First, a company pursuing an IPO 
typically has years of operating history for analysts and investors to 
consider.
130
  Second, a company pursuing an IPO also must fulfill many 
more disclosure requirements than start-up companies seeking crowdfunding 
investment.
131
  In addition, after an IPO, a company’s securities become 
publicly traded, so the wisdom of the crowd is automatically aggregated in 
the company’s public market price; whereas, after a public crowdfunding 
offering, the crowdfunded shares cannot be resold in public markets.  
Therefore, the crowd’s wisdom is not automatically reflected in a market 
price for crowdfunded shares. 
But the analogy to IPOs is helpful because “[i]n many ways the analyst 
is more indispensable to an issuer in the context of an IPO” than in the 
context of securities that are already publicly-traded because in an IPO “the 
public has no baseline from which informed investment decision-making can 
be made.”
132
  If this is true of IPOs, it is even truer of crowdfunding 
offerings.  Crowdfunded public offerings not only confront a similar issue of 
lacking a base line, or established market price, to assess the value of a 
company’s stock, but crowdfunded companies also disclose less 
information, will often have less operating history, and might have unproven 
business models.
133
  Also, crowdfunding offerings suffer the additional 
problem that there will likely be fewer—or no—analysts covering 
crowdfunding offerings of small, start-up companies compared to the 
number of analysts following IPOs.
134
 
Fortunately, the wisdom of the crowd holds the potential to emulate the 
                                                          
 129.  See Cox, supra note 89, at 16 (categorizing “securities that are not traded in an 
informationally efficient market” as including those securities offered in “IPOs and [by] small 
capital reporting companies”). 
 130.  See NVCA Y.B., supra note 128, at 52 (listing in figure 5.03 the median age of companies 
that pursue IPOs from 1985 through 2011, such as 10.3 years, 9.2 years, and 8.2 years in 2009, 2010, 
and 2011, respectively).  
 131.  Cox, supra note 89, at 15–16 (discussing the benefits of the “filtration” system that, in an 
efficient market, benefits all investors, including unsophisticated ones, as analysts fulfill their 
obligations to review public company offering materials). 
 132.  Herbert S. Wander et. al., Developments in Disclosure: Special Problems in Public 
Offerings—Forward-Looking Information, Including the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1996). 
 133.  See NVCA Y.B., supra note 128, at 52 (discussing in figure 5.03 the median size and age 
of companies pursing an IPO). 
 134.  Choi, Company Registration, supra note 122, at 578, 582–83 (observing that “relatively 
small, low-market-capitalization companies issue securities that trade in illiquid markets” and “enjoy 
the attention of only a few analysts, if any”). 
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role of market analysts who cover publicly-traded securities.  To the extent 
the wisdom of many crowdfunding investors is effectively organized and 
aggregated, it should help make the market for crowdfunded securities more 
efficient.  Even though there will not be an open crowdfunding market to 
automatically aggregate investors’ preferences through a stock price, 
crowdfunding investors should benefit from the Internet community serving 
as a proxy for financial analysts who follow public companies but neglect 
small, start-up ventures. 
In today’s Web 2.0 environment,
135
 an interactive communication tool 
between issuers and crowdfunding investors would serve a similar purpose 
to public companies’ long-standing practice of discussing the company with 
market analysts: “[c]ommunication between issuer and analyst serves a 
significant market function in ensuring dissemination of information to the 
marketplace.”
136
  Public companies do not merely disclose legally-required, 
static information; company management also participates in meetings and 
conference calls where a dialogue can be established between analysts and 
executives.
137
  In the Web 2.0 world of crowdfunding investment, though, 
the middleman analyst would be removed and the communication would 
occur directly—and electronically—between the issuer and crowdfunding 
investors. 
Crowdfunding investors would thus begin to establish a relationship 
with company management over the Internet.  The relationship could be 
nurtured not only through written dialogue on electronic comment boards 
but also through Internet video conferencing, among other Internet 
communication mediums.  Relying solely on crowdfunded companies’ 
legally-mandated written disclosures significantly impairs crowdfunding 
investors’ ability to develop the wisdom of the crowd through dialogue and 
ignores both the Internet’s facilitation of inexpensive electronic 
communications and its Web 2.0 culture. 
Furthermore, in traditional start-up company investing, angel investors 
and venture capitalists emphasize personal relationships and frequent 
communication with company founders.
138
  Similarly, though the crowd’s 
                                                          
 135.  Chaffee & Rapp, supra note 9, at 501–02 (contrasting Web 2.0, where Internet users 
participate in content creation, with Web 1.0, where Internet users passively consume media); 
Schwienbacher & Larralde, supra note 27, at 5–6 (discussing Web 2.0 characteristics). 
 136.  Wander, supra note 132, at 1028. 
 137.  See, e.g., Business Earnings Event Calendar, REUTERS.COM, 
http://www.reuters.com/finance/markets/conferenceCalls?country=USA&viewBy=type (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2013) (providing numerous company conference calls with securities analysts). 
 138.  NVCA Y.B., supra note 128, at 7 (“Venture capital partners become actively engaged with 
a company, typically taking a board seat.  With a startup, daily interaction with the management 
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relationship and communication with crowdfunded companies’ founders will 
be of a different nature than that of venture capitalists,
139
 crowdfunding 
investors should follow the lead of venture capitalists and pursue a 
communicative relationship with crowdfunded companies.  Crowdfunding 
laws and regulations should help by guiding crowdfunding investment 
practices toward developing the wisdom of the crowd through organized and 
aggregated Internet dialogue on the funding portals where crowdfunding 
investment occurs—indeed, the SEC’s proposed regulations include a 
provision for interactive communication.
140
 
As explained below, the funding portals where crowdfunding 
investments occur are ideally situated to become effective organizers and 
aggregators of crowdfunding investors’ collective judgments—even if those 
judgments are not reflected in a market price.  The wisdom of the crowd is 
not self-organizing, and absent an automatic aggregator such as market 
price, the wisdom of the crowd is most effective when it is intentionally 
directed towards a goal.
141
  Congress lacked the foresight to embrace the 
Internet’s power to facilitate the wisdom of the crowd through investors’ 
own democratic, grass-roots policing of crowdfunding offerings.  
Nevertheless, the crowdfunding community, and even the SEC, can still 
capitalize on the potential of the wisdom of the crowd to help make 
crowdfunding markets more efficient and to spread the regulatory burden to 
more parties instead of relying solely on the SEC and state regulatory 
agencies. 
C. Funding Portals’ Potential 
Notwithstanding Congress’s failure to require a means of Internet 
dialogue between crowdfunding issuers and investors, the Crowdfund Act 
does potentially create a framework in which the wisdom of the crowd can 
                                                          
team is common.”). 
 139.  The differences include such factors as geographic proximity for venture capitalists versus 
geographic dispersion for crowdfunders, and venture capitalist control rights versus minority 
positions of crowdfunders.  See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL 
CYCLE (2004) (discussing the nature of venture capital investments). 
 140.  Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428-01 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013) (to be codified as 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/33-9470.pdf. 
 141.  HOWE, supra note 7, at 284 (“One of the greatest misapprehensions around crowdsourcing 
is that the crowd works in isolation.  In reality, the most successful crowdsourcing efforts are 
products of a robust collaboration between the crowd and the individuals guiding them . . . .”); Chris 
Wilson, The Wisdom of the Chaperones: Digg, Wikipedia, and the Myth of Web 2.0 Democracy, 
SLATE (Feb. 22, 2008, 6:11 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2184487/ (describing the role aggregators 
and decision-makers play in organizing, monitoring, and directing social media on the Internet). 
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develop into an effective monitoring tool for crowdfunding investments.  
Because crowdfunding investments must occur through registered funding 
portals or registered brokers,
142
 the portals hold great potential for 
organizing crowdfunding investment and aggregating the wisdom of the 
crowd.  The framework is enhanced through the Crowdfund Act’s 
requirement of a high degree of cooperation between funding portals and the 
SEC in regulating crowdfunding investment and through its fostering of 
competition among funding portals. 
Scholars have observed that the Internet offers a means for the SEC to 
(1) rely on, and even compete with, non-governmental third parties for 
certain regulatory functions; and (2) create an environment in which such 
third parties compete with each other for the benefit of investors.
143
  By 
implementing these observations, the Crowdfund Act appropriately tailors 
legal requirements to the Internet’s technological capabilities.  The 
Crowdfund Act astutely, if incompletely, embraces both market forces and 
the cooperative and competitive efficiencies of the Internet to help the SEC 




Funding portals cooperate with the SEC in regulating crowdfunding 
insofar as they share significant responsibilities in helping the SEC reduce 
the risk of fraud, provide disclosures to potential investors, and gather and 
disseminate disclosures from the companies seeking crowdfunding 
investment.
145
  In addition, as funding portals compete for crowdfunding 
investment business, the websites that most efficiently accomplish 
                                                          
 142.  JOBS Act sec. 302(a), § (6)(C).  See also supra note 97 (discussing brokers that facilitate 
crowdfunding investments).  See also Heminway, supra note 55, at 193 (describing the requirements 
of funding portals, as “crowdfunding intermediaries,” under the Crowdfund Act). 
 143.  Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of Small 
Business Capital Formation, J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L., Summer 1998, at 27, 55 (arguing that 
“perhaps the greatest impact of the Internet on securities regulation . . . is to reduce the distinction 
between public and private means of protecting investors”); Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers, 
supra note 121, at 331–33 (describing proposals under which issuers choose between competing 
regulatory systems).  See also Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 868 
(2006) (describing “dialectical regulation” as “intersystemic regulation [i.e.,] cross-jurisdictional 
interactions characterized by jurisdictional overlap and regulatory dependence”); Robert B. Ahdieh, 
The Dialectical Regulation of Rule 14A-8: Intersystemic Governance in Corporate Law, 2 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 165, 170 (2007) (explaining that “dialectical regulation aspires to an integration of 
regulatory regimes”). 
 144.  158 CONG. REC. S1,714–02 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (letter of Mary Schapiro, Securities 
and Exchange Commission Chairman) (observing that “with Commission oversight, these 
intermediaries could serve a critical gatekeeper function, running background checks, facilitating 
small businesses’ provision of complete and adequate disclosures to investors, and providing the 
necessary support for these small businesses”). 
 145.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (a). 
 
386 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
regulatory tasks in a user-friendly way will have a competitive advantage, 
whether through their speed, price, ease-of-use, ability to attract and vet 
high-quality issuers, or other market-driven criteria.  Also, competition 
among funding portals should lead to effective investor protection because 
funding portals that fail to protect investors will likely gain less credibility in 
the market and attract fewer entrepreneurs and investors.
146
  Therefore, due 
to funding portals’ self-interested profit motive and narrow focus on 
crowdfunding investment,
147
 funding portals will possibly be more attentive 
to regulating crowdfunding than the “overworked, underfunded”
148
 SEC 
could be alone. 
Unfortunately, the Crowdfund Act’s cooperative and competitive 
regulatory framework failed to include provisions to foster the development 
of the wisdom of the crowd.  The Crowdfund Act should have required 
funding portals to provide interactive communication functionality on the 
websites where investment decisions are made.  Funding portals need not 
create such functionality from scratch because the functionality could be 
outsourced to existing Internet social media platforms and then integrated 
into the funding portal website.
149
  Including the functionality on the funding 
portal website, though, would encourage funding portals to serve as central 




Hopefully the SEC will take advantage of the Crowdfund Act’s grant of 
substantial rulemaking discretion
151
 and require funding portals to create a 
channel of crowdfunding investment dialogue through the funding portal 
where people decide to invest or not.  At a minimum, consistent with the 
democratic intent of the Crowdfund Act to give all investors access to 
                                                          
 146.  Choi, Company Registration, supra note 122, at 585–86 (discussing how “market-based 
incentives” influence underwriters and other intermediaries in their selection of high- or low-quality 
issuers, and vice versa). 
 147.  Funding portals may also be registered brokers that do more than just crowdfunding.  JOBS 
Act sec. 302(b), § (a)(1).  The focus of such funding portals will be broader than that of funding 
portals that only do crowdfunding transactions, but still narrower than the SEC’s oversight of all 
aspects of securities regulation. 
 148.  John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone Wrong?, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG 
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/01/02/sec-enforcement-what-has-gone-
wrong/ (suggesting that the SEC “retain private counsel on a contingent-fee basis in those large 
cases that it cannot staff adequately itself”). 
 149.  Sigar, supra note 55, at 489–94 (describing several technology solutions that start-up 
companies are already designing to enhance the effectiveness of the wisdom of the crowd). 
 150.  Ibrahim, supra note 45, at 37–38 (emphasizing the benefit of a “central site” that “make[s] 
it easier for buyers and sellers to find one another” and facilitates “efficient price discovery by 
posting recent buy-sell bids and the latest contract price”). 
 151.  See supra notes 37–38. 
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crowdfunded securities offerings, the SEC should require funding portals to 
be open to the public, as the Crowdfund Act did not even include this 
minimal requirement.
152
  Non-public funding portals are antithetical to open, 
democratic websites where the wisdom of the crowd develops. 
Absent a legal requirement, competitive market forces could motivate 
some funding portals to provide interactive communication functionality to 
their users.  For instance, funding portals might find that Internet dialogue 
capabilities attract higher quality issuers and more sophisticated or dedicated 
investors who value transparency and interactive communication.  Also, 
apart from funding portals, other crowdfunding investment websites might 
provide opportunities for investors and entrepreneurs to communicate 
electronically.  But these other sites might not even be linked to the funding 
portals where potential investors make investment decisions, which could 
reduce their impact and lessen their aggregative potential because the 
dialogue will likely be dispersed throughout cyberspace in an unorganized 




In addition, absent a legal requirement, some issuers might decide not to 
communicate with investors at all—perhaps investors would shun a silent 
issuer who relied solely on its legally-mandated, static disclosures, but 
perhaps not.  A better approach would incorporate the wisdom of the crowd 
into the crowdfunding legal framework.  Then crowdfunding investors could 
assess and compare issuers’ responses
154
 on the very websites where 
investment decisions are made.  And the crowd could cultivate its wisdom 
with feedback from issuers in a centralized location where the crowd’s 
wisdom could be usefully aggregated.  Incorporating the wisdom of the 
crowd into crowdfunding investment offerings could also eventually serve as 
                                                          
 152.  Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption, supra note 2, at 219 (“The new 
exemption omits a crucial element of crowdfunding—an open, public communications channel 
allowing potential investors to communicate with the issuer and each other.”). 
 153.  Zachary J. Griffin, Note, Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses, __ CASE W. RES. 
J. L. TECH. & INTERNET __ (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 34–35), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2030001&download=yes (arguing against the 
effectiveness of the wisdom of the crowd but noting that its effectiveness in ferreting out fraud 
depends, in part, on crowdfunding investors being able to see and read information posted by fellow 
investors). 
 154.  Any legal requirement of interactive communication should avoid unduly burdening start-
up company management.  So long as a reasonableness standard applies to companies’ obligations to 
interact with the crowd, though, it should not be too costly for small companies seeking 
crowdfunding investment to correspond with, or hold videoconferences for, potential investors from 
time to time.  In typical Web 2.0 fashion, companies that use crowdfunding will likely value 
correspondence with the crowd and will often view investors as potential customers and promoters 
with whom they want to establish a relationship. 
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a template to be applied to other types of Internet securities offerings.
155
 
VI. UNDERMINING DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION: INVESTMENT CAPS 
Apart from Congress’s failure to incorporate the self-regulating, 
democratic principle of the wisdom of the crowd, the Crowdfund Act’s dual 
dollar caps on investment amounts potentially undermine crowdfunding’s 
democratic virtue of widespread participation.  One of the unintended 
consequences of the two caps could be to exclude from crowdfunding 
investments the very group the Crowdfund Act aims to include: non-
wealthy, retail investors.  The first investment cap is on the aggregate annual 
amount that a company
156
 is permitted to raise through crowdfunding: $1 
million in any twelve-month period.
157
  The second cap is on the aggregate 
annual amount that a person may invest through crowdfunding, varying 
according to an investor’s wealth.
158
 
The cap on the amount of each person’s annual crowdfunding 
investments is based on the investor’s annual income or net worth.
159
  The 
cap applies to the investor’s aggregate crowdfunding investments, not each 
separate investment.
160
  As shown in the table below, in any twelve month 
period, the cap on each investor is either (i) “the greater of $2,000 or 5 
percent of the annual income or net worth of such investor, as applicable, if 
either the annual income or the net worth of the investor is less than 
$100,000,”
161
 or (ii) “10 percent of the annual income or net worth of such 
investor, as applicable, not to exceed a maximum aggregate amount sold of 
$100,000, if either the annual income or net worth of the investor is equal to 
                                                          
 155.  Crowdfunding is a good test case for interactive communication requirements because the 
wisdom of the crowd is native to crowdfunding and crowdsourcing.  But as the Internet continues to 
influence investing practices, interactive communications over the Internet could become more 
commonplace with respect to non-crowdfunding investments.  For instance, now that the JOBS Act 
will allow Rule 506 offerings to be made to the general public so long as only accredited investors 
actually purchase securities in the offerings, a logical expansion of Internet dialogue and reliance on 
the wisdom of the crowd would be to incorporate them into Rule 506 offerings that are made over 
the Internet. See supra note 29. 
 156.  Only U.S. start-up companies and small businesses that are not subject to periodic reporting 
obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are eligible to sell securities under the 
Crowdfund Act.  JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (f). 
 157.  JOBS Act Sec. 302(a), § (6)(A).  
 158.  Id. § (6)(B). 
 159.  Id.  Poor draftsmanship of the per-investor cap provision may lead to confusion of the exact 
cap that applies in some cases.  Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption, supra note 2, 
at 200–01, 216. 
 160.  JOBS Act Sec. 302(a), § (6)(A)–(B). 
 161.  Id. § (6)(B)(i).  
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or more than $100,000.”
162
 
Translating these percentages into whole numbers, Table 1 below shows 
the dollar amount of the cap that would apply to different investors based on 
the amount of the investor’s annual income or net worth. 
Table 1 
Caps on Crowdfunding Investors 
Annual Income 















The rule is designed to limit the potential losses of investors who would 
have difficulty bearing the loss of their entire investment, as is likely to 
occur with some frequency given the failure rate of start-up businesses.
163
  
Ironically, there is no analogously paternalistic measure that limits the 
amount gamblers may put at risk, even in games of pure chance.
164
  
Furthermore, as discussed below, the Crowdfund Act’s individual 
investment caps do not fit either the character of crowdfunding or its current 
practices.  They also openly discriminate against investors on the basis of 
wealth, thereby providing an opportunity for wealthy investors to crowd out 
                                                          
 162.  Id. § (6)(B)(ii).  The SEC is directed to adjust all dollar caps for inflation at least once 
every five years.  Id. § (h). 
 163.  See, e.g., Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 20, 2012, at B.1 (referencing several different measures of the rate of start-up company 
failure). 
 164.  E.g., Rodrigues, supra note 4, at 3428–29 (“[G]overnment intervention in this particular 
market [i.e., risky private securities markets generally] seems unjustifiable for a number of reasons.  
Focusing on the risks that stocks pose is somewhat inexplicable, given that individuals are free to 
lose their shirts a variety of ways.  People can purchase cars or homes they cannot afford, or gamble 
away their savings in a casino or on lottery tickets, all without government interference.  While it is 
true that the market might price some buyers out of certain mortgages or car loans, having a market 
judge that people cannot afford to buy an item is quite different from the government prohibiting 
them from purchasing it as a matter of law.”). 
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poorer investors. 
A. High Per Person Amounts 
The Crowdfund Act’s caps on the amount investors are allowed to 
invest, both on the low end of inviting the poor to invest up to $2,000 and on 
the high end of authorizing the rich to invest up to $100,000, are 
incongruous with the nature of crowdfunding.
165
  Even the definition of 
crowdfunding implies a low dollar cap, as the term means leveraging the 
democratic power of the masses so that many people contribute small 
amounts—and thereby risk little—to make a large collective impact.
166
 
Empirical evidence bears out this meaning.  Kiva’s tagline is “Empower 
people around the world with a $25 loan,”
167
 and the average per-person 
contribution on Kiva appears to be approximately $40.
168
  During the 
Senate’s debate on crowdfunding investment, one senator cited the 
crowdfunding campaign to fund the Blue Like Jazz movie and noted that 
contributions were received “from a pool of 3,000 donors, most of whom 
donated $100 or less.”
169
  In addition, a sampling of Kickstarter campaign 
results indicates that the great majority of crowdfunders of non-equity, 
creative projects contribute less—and usually much less—than $500.
170
  
                                                          
 165.  Lina Jasinskaite, Note, The JOBS Act: Does the Income Cap Really Protect Investors?, 90 
DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 81, 81 (2013) (arguing that “the cap was set too high to serve as an 
adequate protection for investors”). 
 166.  See Crowdfunding: Connecting Investors and Job Creators: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on TARP, Fin. Serv. and Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov. Reform, 112th Cong. 112–118 (2011) (statement of Meredith B. Cross, Director, Division of 
Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) (defining crowdfunding as “a form 
of capital raising whereby groups of people pool money, typically comprised of very small 
individual contributions, to support an effort by others to accomplish a specific goal”).  See also 158 
CONG. REC. S1764-04 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (statement of Sen. Harry Reed) (describing 
crowdfunding as involving “relatively small investments from many individuals through online 
platforms”). 
 167.  KIVA, http://www.kiva.org (last visited Nov. 18, 2013). 
 168.  Statistics, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/stats (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).  Although 
Kiva does not appear to publish average per-user loan amounts, it does state that the average total 
amount loaned per Kiva user, including re-loaned funds, is $410.59.  Id.  Kiva also states that the 
average number of loans per Kiva user is 10.01.  Id.  Therefore, as an approximation of the average 
per-loan amount, dividing $410.59 by 10.01 gives $41.02 per Kiva loan.  
 169.  158 CONG. REC. S1824-02 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Jeffrey Merkley) 
(stating that crowdfunding investment “enables aspiring entrepreneurs to access investment capital 
via the Internet from small dollar investors across America”). 
 170.  See Discover / Most Funded, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/discover/most-
funded? (last visited Nov. 18, 2013).  Kickstarter does not appear to publish average contribution 
amounts per contributor.  Id.  Reviewing the campaign results of successfully funded campaigns 
reveals, however, that contributions of less than $500 are much more frequent than larger 
contributions.  Id. 
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And Kickstarter does not even allow contributions in excess of $10,000.
171
 
But it is possible, and even likely, that people will invest more in a for-
profit entity that offers some hope of a monetary return than they would 
contribute to other causes in which no monetary return is available.  But 
even in the for-profit context, available evidence suggests that the average 
investment amount will remain substantially lower than the Crowdfund 
Act’s caps.
172
  In 1996, Spring Street Brewing Company’s direct public 
offering over the Internet averaged investments of approximately $570 per 
investor.
173
  The average pledge to Pabst Brewing Company’s crowdfunding 
campaign was approximately $40 per investor.
174
  And a French start-up 
company received average investments of €510 per investor, with the 
majority of investors committing the minimum required investment of €300, 
to fund the development of a social media website on world travel.
175
  The 
French start-up company sold shares at a high minimum investment amount 
because, under French law, it needed to keep the number of shareholders 
below one hundred.
176
  Absent this legal requirement, the average 
investment would likely have been even lower, as the majority of investors 
opted to contribute the minimum amount.
177
 
The Crowdfund Act, though, allows even indigent people to invest up to 
$2,000, and the cap quickly increases above $2,000 for people with an 
annual income or net worth above $40,000.
178
  It is not clear what justifies a 
cap that is significantly higher than what past experience suggests is 
necessary for crowdfunding investment and that far exceeds what most 
commentators had advocated.
179
  By applying such an incongruously high 
                                                          
 171.  Mollick, supra note 20, at 6. 
 172.  See Crowdfunding, TRAMPOLINE SYSTEMS, http://crowdfunding.trampolinesystems.com/ 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (detailing a large equity crowdfunding effort in the U.K. aiming to raise 
£1 million in four crowdfunding investment rounds, exclusively from existing shareholders and 
“people certified as high net worth individuals or as sophisticated investors,” though information 
about average investment amounts does not appear to be publicly available). 
 173.  Pope, supra note 28, at 978–79. 
 174.  Cease-and-Desist Order for Michael Migliozzi II & Brian William Flatow, supra note 71, 
at 3 (stating that over $200 million total was pledged by more than 5 million people, which makes 
the average pledge per person approximately $40).  
 175.  Schwienbacher & Larralde, supra note 27, at 14–16 (describing the Media No Mad 
campaign for its website, www.benoot.com, and noting that eighty-one investors purchased an 
average of 1.7 shares each at €300 per share, with the majority of investors purchasing only one 
share). 
 176.  Id. at 17 (discussing the impact of French legal requirements on Media No Mad’s 
crowdfunding offering). 
 177.  Id. at 15–16 (stating “most investors bought only one share,” which were £300 each). 
 178.  See supra Table 1; JOBS Act sec. 302(a), § (6)(B)(i). 
 179.  See, e.g., Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 28, at 118 
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cap, the Crowdfund Act undermines crowdfunding’s native virtue of 
diversifying risk throughout the crowd and unnecessarily increases the 
amount of each investor’s potential risk. 
The high per person investment cap is also incongruous with 
crowdfunding’s character because it allows wealthy investors to invest a 
large portion of the amount, or even the entire amount, that a company is 
seeking to raise.  For instance, a company seeking to raise the maximum 
annual amount of $1 million could be fully funded by ten people, each of 
whom had an annual income or net worth of at least $1 million.  If a 
company wishes to raise that amount—or larger amounts—of money from a 
group of wealthy investors, it can do so under other exemptions, most likely 
Rule 506.
180
  Doing so in a crowdfunding offering, though, could eviscerate 
the crowd from crowdfunding investment, unless protective measures such 
as those described below are included in crowdfunding regulations.  Such 
protections would become even more important if certain types of investors, 
such as accredited or institutional investors, are exempted from the $100,000 
individual investment cap and permitted to invest even higher amounts.
181
 
Allowing the capitalist characteristic of start-up companies’ typical 
preference for a few wealthy investors—as described in Part IV—to 
undermine crowdfunding’s democratic virtue of participation by all 
exemplifies “the corrosive effect of markets on nonmarket norms.”
182
  To 
the extent capitalist values dominate crowdfunding, the non-market virtue of 
crowdfunding—i.e., widespread democratic participation—may be 
                                                          
(suggesting annual investment caps of between $250,000 and $500,000 per year for each company 
and $500 or 2% of the investor’s annual income for each investor); Heminway & Hoffman, supra 
note 28, at 948–49 (stating their belief that companies should be limited to raising an annual amount 
of “$100,000, $250,000, or possibly even lower thresholds,” and each investor should be capped at 
an annual amount of $100 or $250 “in a single offering or over a specified period, unless the investor 
is an accredited investor or sophisticated” (footnotes omitted)); Pope, supra note 28, at 996–99 
(advocating a per investor limit of $1,000 per year without distinction between accredited and 
unaccredited investors and an annual cap of $250,000 for each start-up company, and citing the 
Sustainable Economies Law Center’s proposal of caps at $100,000 per company and $100 per 
investor). 
 180.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 181.  See Ellenoff, supra note 57, at 21–22 (advocating for the Crowdfund Act’s investment caps 
to not apply to “accredited investors and institutional investors”). 
 182.  MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 120, 
203 (2012) (arguing that “the marketization of everything means that people of affluence and people 
of modest means lead increasingly separate lives . . . . You might call it the skyboxification of 
American life.  It’s not good for democracy . . .”).  Extending this observation to crowdfunding, the 
marketization of crowdfunding would allow wealthy investors to preempt other investors from 
participating in crowdfunding, thereby destroying crowdfunding’s original democratic character and 
foreclosing retail investors’ opportunity to invest in start-up companies, just as retail investors lacked 
these opportunities prior to the Crowdfund Act. 
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degraded, as has occurred in other markets.
183
  Apart from crowdfunding, 
retail investors are already “crowded out” of the broader private securities 
market, which is in stark opposition to “the model of democratic capitalism 
that has defined [public company investing] for nearly a century.”
184
  
Crowdfunding investments must not succumb to the same fate as other 
private securities investments but instead should retain their democratic 
character of public participation. 
Crowdfunding, and specifically the risk the Crowdfund Act creates of 
wealthy investors undermining democratic participation in crowdfunding, 
illustrates the observation that due to “[t]he democratization of technological 
power . . . [t]he individual holds more power than at any time in the past 
century, and literally in the palm of his hand.  Whether or not he can hold on 
to it is another matter.”
185
  Crowdfunding laws and regulations should be 
structured to help retail investors hold on to the democratic promise of 
crowdfunding.  Consistent with the idea “that government’s only proper role 
in the market [is] to ensure opportunity, not to favor entrenched interests,”
186
 
crowdfunding laws and regulations should provide all investors with an 
opportunity to participate in crowdfunding investment offerings and not 
allow wealthy investors to crowd out retail investors. 
As currently structured, the Crowdfund Act’s two caps—the $1 million 
annual limit on the amount companies can raise and the high amounts 
wealthy investors may invest (up to $100,000 each)—collaborate to favor 
wealthy investors and potentially exclude other investors.  As described in 
Part IV above, companies’ capitalist preference for fewer, wealthier 
investors is at odds with crowdfunding’s democratic nature that thrives on 
the participation of many people.  Yet, also as noted in Part IV, democratic 
principles of periodic reporting are incorporated into the Crowdfund Act in 
anticipation of many investors participating in crowdfunding offerings.  
Similarly, the democratic nature of crowdfunding should guide investment 
cap rules so that the high investment caps for wealthy investors do not 
undermine crowdfunding’s democratic value of widespread participation. 
                                                          
 183.  E.g., WENDELL BERRY, LIFE IS A MIRACLE: AN ESSAY AGAINST MODERN SUPERSTITION 
51–55 (2000) (discussing how economic values can destroy non-economic values and asserting that 
“you cannot preserve the traditional rights and liberties of a democracy by the mechanical principles 
of economic totalitarianism”). 
 184.  Gubler, supra note 4, at 800. 
 185.  WU, supra note 44, at 298. 
 186.  Id. at 309. 
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B. Wealthy Investors and Crowds of Investors 
Both the nature of crowdfunding and the political intent behind the 
Crowdfund Act indicate that crowdfunding investment offerings should be 
open to all Internet investors.  For example, President Barack Obama 
explained the purpose of the Crowdfund Act when signing it into law: 
Right now, [start-ups and small businesses] can only turn to a limited 
group of investors—including banks and wealthy individuals—to get 
funding.  Laws that are nearly eight decades old make it impossible for 
others to invest.  But a lot has changed in 80 years, and it’s time our 
laws did as well.  Because of [the Crowdfund Act], start-ups and small 
business will now have access to a big, new pool of potential 
investors—namely, the American people.  For the first time, ordinary 




The Senate debate on the Crowdfund Act sounded similar themes: 
“[c]rowdfunding will create a new alternative market for capital formation 
by allowing every American—regardless of income or wealth—to invest in 
a start-up or a great idea” and “[it] will allow small businesses to bypass 
Wall Street and go straight to Main Street for financing.”
188
  Another senator 
asserted that the Crowdfund Act should “make the [start-up company 
investing] process more democratic”
189
 and allow “ordinary people, middle-
class people [to] get involved in creating wealth through investing, instead 
of it being a small club of those who may go to the same school or go to the 




But the Crowdfund Act’s high per person investment caps allow 
wealthy investors to invest all or a large portion of the amount an issuer of 
crowdfunded securities seeks to raise.  This right for wealthy investors could 
undermine the democratic intent of the Crowdfund Act; therefore, 
crowdfunding laws should provide a mechanism for all investors to have the 
opportunity to participate in crowdfunding offerings without being 
                                                          
 187.  Barack Obama, President, United States of America, Remarks by the President at JOBS 
Act Bill Signing (Apr. 5, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-act-bill-signing. 
 188.  158 CONG. REC. S2229-01 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown).  See 
also 158 CONG. REC. S1884-01 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown) (noting 
that “only very wealthy people in years past have been able to participate in these types of [start-up 
company stock] offerings”). 
 189.  158 CONG. REC. S1824-02 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. Landrieu). 
 190.  158 CONG. REC. S1776-02 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (statement of Sen. Landrieu). 
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preempted by wealthy investors.  As described below, two rules would help 
address the potential problem of wealthy investors crowding out the crowd. 
1. Prevent High Minimum Investment Amounts 
Under the first rule, crowdfunding laws and regulations should prohibit 
issuers from setting minimum per-person investment amounts above a de 
minimis threshold.  For instance, a rule of this type would avoid the problem 
of an issuer setting a minimum investment amount of, say, $5,000.  A 
$5,000 minimum would exclude any investor with an annual income or net 
worth below $100,000 because the Crowdfund Act’s cap on such investors 
is $4,999.
191
  Companies seeking crowdfunding investment should not be 
allowed to hijack democratic participation under the Crowdfund Act by 
excluding investors below a certain annual income or net worth threshold.  
After all, those very investors were the intended beneficiaries of the 
Crowdfund Act’s innovative approach to opening start-up company 
investments to the general public. 
Although issuers that are starved for capital will likely welcome 
investment from any investor in any amount, some start-up companies may 
want to follow the common practice described in Part IV of minimizing the 
number of investors.  Such companies are free to limit the number of 
investors and set a high minimum investment amount in offerings made 
under other securities law exemptions, such as Rule 506.
192
  The Crowdfund 
Act, though, is designed to encourage companies to solicit investors from 
among the general public, which includes soliciting investment from 
unsophisticated and unaccredited investors.
193
  But if issuers set high 
minimum investment amounts, then crowdfunding offerings will, in fact, 
only be open to wealthy investors.  Companies should not be allowed to 
solicit investments from the democratic masses through crowdfunding only 
to deny investment access to people whom the Crowdfund Act was intended 
                                                          
 191.  See supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text and Table 1. 
 192.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  Issuers will have even easier access to 
accredited investors now that the JOBS Act removes the restriction on general solicitations from 
Rule 506 offerings while still requiring that purchasers be accredited investors.  JOBS Act sec. 
201(a)(1).  Prior to the JOBS Act’s removal of the prohibition against public solicitations in Rule 
506 offerings, many websites would pre-qualify investors as accredited and allow issuers to sell 
securities exclusively to this pre-qualified group under Rule 506, thus avoiding the—now-revised—
prohibition on general solicitations.  See, e.g., SECONDMARKET, https://www.secondmarket.com 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 193.  See JOBS Act sec. 302(b), § (b)(2) (allowing public solicitation but requiring that issuers 
advertise crowdfunding offerings only through “notices which direct investors to the funding portal 
or broker” where the crowdfunded securities are sold). 
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to benefit. 
Of course, an issuer might have a legitimate business interest in only 
accepting investments above a de minimis amount, such as $0.10, $1.00, 
$100, or even $500.  Exactly where the SEC sets a minimum investment 
amount is somewhat arbitrary.
194
  But the highest minimum investment 
amount that should be allowed is $2,000, which is the lowest cap applicable 
to any crowdfunding investor.
195
  At that threshold, no investor would be 
legally barred from participating in a crowdfunding offering on the basis of 
insufficient annual income or net worth. 
It would be incongruous, however, to allow issuers to force investors 
with an annual income or net worth below $40,000 to invest at least $2,000 
when the Crowdfund Act permits such investors to invest at most $2,000.  
Therefore, it would be reasonable to set legal requirements for minimum 
investment amounts at less than $2,000, perhaps $100 or $500.  Issuers 
could always elect a per investor limit below the legally-mandated minimum 
offering amount.  Whatever the amount, crowdfunded companies should not 
be allowed to exclude smaller investors in violation of the democratic intent 
of the Crowdfund Act. 
2. Define Closing and Oversubscription Procedures 
A second, conceptually similar, problem could be resolved by a multi-
part rule.  The Crowdfund Act requires issuers to commit to a target funding 
amount and a deadline to reach the target amount.
196
  The target funding 
deadline must be at least twenty-one days—or “other period [that] the [SEC] 
may establish”—after the beginning of the offering.
197
  But the Crowdfund 
                                                          
 194.  Reference points from examples mentioned above include approximate average of $41 for 
Kiva loans, less than $500—and in many cases less than $100—for many successful Kickstarter 
campaigns, $570 in Spring Street Brewing Company’s Internet offering under Regulation A, and 
$40 pledges in the crowdfunding initiative to buy Pabst Brewing Company.  See supra notes 170, 
172, 175–76 and accompanying text.  This sample is obviously not an exhaustive empirical analysis, 
which is outside the scope of this article, but the examples do support the fact that crowdfunding, by 
definition and in practice, involves the pooling of small amounts of money from many people. 
 195.  JOBS Act sec. 302(a), §§ (6)(A)–(B). 
 196.  Id. sec. 302(b), § (b)(1)(F).  The issuer must also provide regular updates on its progress in 
reaching the target funding amount. Id.  Investor funds may only be disbursed to companies after the 
target amount is reached, and the SEC is directed to determine appropriate rules for crowdfunding 
investors to be allowed to cancel investment commitments.  Id. § (a)(7).  The company must also 
state the price of the securities or “the method for determining the price.”  Id. § (b)(1)(G).  If the 
method of determination—but not the actual price—is initially provided, the final price must be 
disclosed prior to the closing of the offering, and investors must have “a reasonable opportunity to 
rescind [their] commitment” to invest after learning the final price.  Id. 
 197.  Id. § (a)(6).  The twenty-one day waiting period is created by requiring companies to make 
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Act is silent on several related details, such as whether an offering closes—
or may close—immediately upon reaching the target funding amount and 
how issuers should handle investments that exceed the target funding 
amount—i.e., over-subscribed offerings. 
The following example illustrates the potential problem and this article’s 
proposed solution.  If an issuer sets the aggregate target funding amount at 
$100,000, and one investor with an annual income or net worth of at least $1 
million invests the full $100,000 before anyone else invests, then other 
investors who want to participate could be barred—i.e., one wealthy 
investor, or a handful of wealthy investors, could crowd out the crowd.  But 
if the offering is not closed—and further investment commitments are not 
refused—upon reaching the target funding amount, and there is a mechanism 
for managing oversubscriptions, then other investors will have the 
opportunity to participate. 
To alleviate the potential for smaller investors to be crowded out and to 
preserve democratic participation in crowdfunding offerings, crowdfunding 
rules should include three additional provisions regarding investment 
commitments.  First, the issuer should not be allowed to reject investment 
commitments that are received prior to the closing of the offering.  Second, 
issuers should be required to either accept investment commitments that 
exceed the target funding amount
198
 or reduce the excess commitments in 
accordance with a specified formula described below.  Third, investors 
should be allowed to cancel their commitment to invest at any time prior to 
the closing of the offering.
199
 
In addition, once investment commitments reach the target funding 
amount, the issuer should have the option to provide written notice of its 
intent to close the offering early—e.g., five business days’ prior written 
                                                          
mandatory disclosures available to investors and the SEC at least twenty-one days before 
consummating sales of any crowdfunded securities.  Id.  
 198.  The Crowdfund Act contemplates oversubscriptions insofar as investment proceeds may 
only be distributed to issuers “when the aggregate capital raised from all investors is equal to or 
greater than a target offering amount.”  Id. § (a)(7) (emphasis added).  The Senate debate record 
indicates that oversubscriptions were discussed. See 158 CONG. REC. S1824-02 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 
2012) (statement of Sen. Merkley).  Senator Merkley illustrates oversubscriptions through the 
example of a company that seeks: “$550,000 to do X, when Americans across the country have put 
forward enough small investments to reach that goal of $550,000, the investment would close.  But it 
also allows, if investors decide they are offering more—maybe folks sign up, and they are so excited 
about this vision, this product, this invention, this strategy, that they say: I am putting up $750,000, 
even though you only asked for $550,000—it would still enable the small company to say: No, we 
can use that extra $200,000, thank you very much, if they should choose to do so.”  Id. 
 199.  The component of the proposed rule that allows investors to cancel investment 
commitments aligns with the Crowdfund Act’s directive that the SEC implement appropriate rules 
that “allow all investors to cancel their commitments to invest.”  Id. sec. 302(b), § (a)(7). 
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notice, posted on the funding portal and emailed to all investors who made 
investment commitments—so long as the offering remains open for at least 
twenty-one total days.  It is true that a consequence of these rules could 
include creating an incentive for investors not to invest until after a 
company’s target amount is reached.  The incentive would arise because 
rational investors would realize they could not be excluded from an offering 
that is fully subscribed.  Therefore, they might only invest after other 
investors demonstrate so much interest in an offering that the company 
exceeds its target funding amount. 
To address this potential incentive to invest only after a company 
reaches the target funding amount, the legal rules, or the company, could 
give preference to investments made prior to the company reaching its 
funding goal.  For example, investments made after reaching the target 
amount could be reduced more aggressively through a modified proration 
calculation.  As an alternative, investors who participate after the target 
amount is reached could be capped at a maximum total ownership amount 
that ensures they cannot unduly benefit, at the expense of earlier investors, 
from waiting to invest until after the target amount was reached.  This 
approach would create an incentive to invest early, while at the same time 
not excluding those who invest late. 
A specific example will help show the rule’s effect.  Suppose a company 
is seeking a total crowdfunding investment of $100,000, and, before the 
closing of the offering, sixteen people commit to invest a total of $205,500.  
And suppose the sixteen investors’ commitments are divided as follows: one 
person commits to invest $100,000; five people commit to invest $20,000; 
five people commit to invest $1,000; and five people commit to invest $100. 
In that case, under this article’s proposed rule, the issuer could choose 
one of two options: the issuer could accept the full $205,500, even though it 
exceeds $100,000; or the company could reduce each investment according 
to a standard formula in order to bring the total investment amount to 
$100,000, while still allowing all investors to participate.
200
  The formula 
would apply if either (1) the issuer was unwilling to accept investments 
greater than the target investment amount or (2) the total commitments 
exceeded the annual cap on issuers of $1 million. 
 The formula could be designed in numerous ways, and issuers could 
choose among multiple options or design their own formulas.  Two 
                                                          
 200.  Of course, if issuers set a de minimis floor price for the crowdfunded securities, then the 
number of investors able to participate in the offering will in effect become capped, regardless of the 
formula used.  For example, if issuers will only accept investments of $10 or more, then for a $1 
million offering, no more than 100,000 investors can participate. 
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possibilities would be a pro rata calculation or a rolling calculation.  The pro 
rata calculation would reduce each person’s investment by the same 
percentage.  The rolling calculation would rank all investment commitments 
and allow each person to invest the amount of the lowest commitment, then 
the second lowest commitment, etc., until the full $100,000 was filled.  The 
rolling calculation would reduce larger investments more than smaller 
investments.  Using the hypothetical example above, the tables below show 
the results of both a straight pro rata calculation and a rolling calculation. 
 
Table 2 

















$100 5 $49 $243 48.66% 
$1,000 5 $487 $2,433 48.66% 
$20,000 5 $9,732 $48,662 48.66% 









Under the pro rata calculation in the table above, each person’s 
investment is 48.66% of the person’s commitment.  In contrast, under the 
rolling calculation shown in the table below, the investors who commit 
lower amounts invest the full amount, or a greater percentage, of their 
commitment.  Correspondingly, the investors who commit higher amounts 



















$100 5 $100 $500 100% 
$1,000 5 $1,000 $5,000 100% 
$20,000 5 $15,750 $78,750 78.75% 
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Under both calculations, sixteen people invest an aggregate of $100,000.  
Under the pro rata calculation, 48.66% of the amount of all commitments is 
invested.  But under the rolling calculation, 100% of each $100 and $1,000 
commitment is invested.  Then, under the rolling calculation, 78.75% of 
each $20,000 commitment is invested, and 15.75% of the $100,000 
commitment is invested.  Regardless of which formula is used, the rule 
honors the democratic spirit of the Crowdfund Act by giving all investors, 
irrespective of income or net worth, an opportunity to participate in 
crowdfunded securities offerings. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Internet crowdfunding developed as a grass-roots, democratic 
movement for activities like non-profit fundraising, financing creative ideas, 
and peer-to-peer lending.  As the Crowdfund Act legalizes crowdfunding 
investment in start-up companies, though, crowdfunding’s democratic ethos 
intrudes on capitalism’s domain of start-up company investing—just as the 
capitalist forces of start-up company investing collide with democratic 
participation in crowdfunding.  This article analyzed three examples to 
illustrate how the Crowdfund Act alternately incorporates, rejects, and 
potentially undermines democratic participation in its attempt to unite 
crowdfunding and start-up company investing. 
The first example showed that notwithstanding the small size of 
crowdfunded companies, the Crowdfund Act incorporates the 
democratically-oriented principle of requiring annual disclosures to 
crowdfunding investors.  This is a sensibly unique requirement because 
crowdfunded companies are likely to have many investors, like a public 
company.  One potential improvement on the annual disclosure requirement 
could be to require more frequent, but less detailed, electronic 
communications to complement the interactive nature of Web 2.0 Internet 
culture and foster the development of the wisdom of the crowd. 
The article’s second example demonstrated how the Crowdfund Act 
fails to incorporate an important democratic characteristic of crowdfunding: 
the wisdom of the crowd.  The Crowdfund Act does not require a 
mechanism of electronic communication between investors and companies 
seeking crowdfunding investment.  The omission is short-sighted because it 
fails to take advantage of the technological capabilities that the Internet 
offers to improve the SEC’s cooperation with non-governmental 
regulators—i.e., crowdfunding investors themselves.  Accordingly, the 
SEC’s crowdfunding regulations, or a Congressional amendment to the 
Crowdfund Act, should require funding portals to make this functionality 
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available on the websites where crowdfunding investment decisions are 
made. 
Finally, the article’s third example highlighted an area where market 
forces could undermine democratic participation in crowdfunding.  The 
Crowdfund Act’s high caps on the amount individual investors may invest 
through crowdfunding create the potential for retail investors to be crowded 
out of promising crowdfunding offerings.  In view of the Crowdfund Act’s 
ambitious, democratic promise of opening start-up company investing to the 
general public, crowdfunding regulations should (1) prohibit issuers from 
setting high minimum investment amounts that bar lower-income investors 
from participating in crowdfunding offerings and (2) establish clear 
procedures for closing crowdfunding offerings and pro rating 
oversubscriptions so that all investors have an opportunity to participate in 
crowdfunding investment offerings. 
In principle, crowdfunding laws and regulations should protect and 
nurture crowdfunding’s democratic ethos of open access for all in order for 
the Crowdfund Act to deliver on its dual innovation of granting the general 
public access to investments in start-up companies and granting start-up 
companies access to funds from the general public. 
 
